

ARI Research Note 96-17

# **Pattern Recognition Training for Combat Leaders: Sample Training Package**

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
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# PATTERN RECOGNITION TRAINING FOR COMBAT LEADERS: SAMPLE TRAINING PACKAGE

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

This paper explains the contents of the attached storyboards. The storyboards were developed as a product of Task 5 of the Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Phase I Project entitled "Pattern Recognition for Combat Leaders" (contract number MDA903-89-C-005). The contract is being conducted in coordination with the U.S. Army Research Institute in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. The title of Task 5 is "Prepare Training Materials."

This paper identifies:

- the subject matter content of the attached storyboards
- pattern recognition characteristics demonstrated by the storyboards
- pattern recognition characteristics not demonstrated by the storyboards.

## **2. SUBJECT MATTER CONTENT**

This is a demonstration package which illustrates an implementation of the pattern recognition approach to training. It shows the development of key concepts (patterns) which will be necessary for threat evaluation during intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The content of these patterns was chosen to coincide with Lesson 7 of the Tactical Commanders Development Course (TCDC), taught at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Lesson 7 is entitled "IPB: Threat Evaluation and Integration (Defense Week)." TCDC is a two-week course, and Lesson 7 is a three-hour lesson which is scheduled to occur on the second day of the course. The lesson which precedes Lesson 7 is Mission Analysis IPB, and the lesson which follows Lesson 7 is The U.S. Task Force in the Defense.

The demonstration materials provide training for Soviet tactical considerations of a motorized rifle regiment during two tactical situations: attack of a defending enemy and a meeting engagement.

## **3. POSITION OF DEMONSTRATION WITHIN THE LEARNING HIERARCHY**

The pattern recognition approach makes extensive use of the concept of learning hierarchies. Simple skills and concepts are taught first. Afterwards, the more complex skills and concepts are taught. An important reason for this progression is that the simpler skills are often components of the more complex skills. Having learned the simpler skills first, the trainee finds the acquisition of the more complex skills easier because he has already partially acquired them by virtue of having acquired component skills. Gagne (1970) defines a learning hierarchy as "a set of intellectual skills that are ordered in a manner indicating substantial amounts of positive transfer from those skills of lower position to connected ones of higher position" (p. 239).

### 3.1. Overlearning

The pattern recognition approach to training makes use of the learning hierarchy concept in two ways. First, the order of the lesson presentations follows that prescribed by the hierarchy, with simple skills being taught earlier than complex ones. Second, skills at the lower levels of the hierarchy are overlearned before trying to master the more complex skills. Overlearning refers to the continued practice of a skill after the trainee has achieved a minimally acceptable level of performance on a task. Overlearning tends to increase skill retention and the speed with which the skill is executed. According to the pattern recognition approach to training, most skills should be taught to the point of automaticity. When this has been accomplished, the trainee requires very little attention to perform the skill, and he can perform it quite rapidly. Automatic performance of a complex task appears to be the result of extensive practice (LaBerge & Samuels, 1974).

### 3.2. Sample Lesson

While these are general principles of the pattern recognition approach to training, it is not possible to include every level of the hierarchy in a single demonstration package. For instance, according to the pattern recognition approach to training, lower level concepts in the threat evaluation learning hierarchy should be overlearned prior to addressing the specific enabling learning objectives (ELOs) identified for Lesson 7. Examples of lower level concepts are the types and quantities of equipment associated with each type of Soviet unit. Without having these concepts overlearned, the trainee will find some of the concepts in the demonstration exercises more difficult to master.

This demonstration contains only one or two sample exercises for concepts higher in the threat evaluation hierarchy. Exercises which represent higher level concepts in the hierarchy include sequences of reports and situation maps and the identification of their implications for each staff position and for each echelon. In a fully developed package, the trainee would be provided extensive practice identifying important pattern classifications (methods of attack, attacking a defending enemy, meeting engagements, etc.) using these input stimuli (sequences of reports and situation maps).

The development of many higher level exercises will require consultation with successful commanders and their staffs. One of the premises of pattern recognition training is that experts view their domain in a specific way which facilitates problem solving within that domain. In order to represent the successful battalion commander's view of threat evaluation in a meeting engagement with a Soviet motorized rifle regiment, it will probably be necessary to consult with some successful battalion commanders. The result of this consultation would provide a view of the threat evaluation process which is not available in any textbook and not specifically taught in any course. If these patterns can be taught in a computer-based medium, then any future battalion commander with a computer can learn to use these cognitive tools to solve problems in the same manner as the experts.

## **4. ANTICIPATED PRESENTATION MEDIUM**

### **4.1. Ultimate Implementation**

Since the pattern recognition training approach involves learning beyond the simple mastery level, large numbers of exercises are required. Large numbers of exercises can present two potential problems: 1) scheduling a time when a group can be gathered in one location for training, and 2) presenting enough exercises for mastery by everyone without presenting more exercises than necessary to those who master the concept quickly.

Computer managed training solves both problems. For the mastery of basic patterns (individual training), it allows any individual to train whenever he has the time--without requiring the coordination of schedules of an entire group of people.

To address the second problem, computer-based training allows for tailoring the number of practice examples to the individual. People learn at different rates. Furthermore, individuals find some concepts more difficult to master than others. A huge number of practice examples are required in order to present enough practice for every person to learn every concept beyond the mastery level. A computer-based training implementation allows a trainee to use only as many of the exercises as he requires for mastery. Once a concept is mastered, the trainee can move on to higher level concepts.

A computer managed training program offers a number of specific options for tailoring the number of practice stimuli to the trainee's needs. Perhaps the simplest is to allow the trainee to select additional training examples until he thinks he has reached an adequate level of mastery. This option does not require sophisticated computer managed instruction routines, and it would provide the trainee with a greater feeling of control over his own training. Furthermore, there is some evidence that a trainee's perceptions of self-efficacy are rather accurate (Owen & Froman, 1989). Other options for tailoring the number of training presentations are a criterion for the number of consecutive correct answers and a criterion speed for providing correct answers. The advantage of these computer-controlled cutoffs is that they objectively measure the amount of overlearning and automaticity without relying on the subjective judgement of the trainee. They also help to insure a more uniform level of skill achieved by trainees who have completed a computer managed course.

Since the first option requires less development time, it is recommended that development begin with the first option. If initial field trials indicate that trainees are reaching mastery levels when left to their own discretion, then some development time has been saved. If they are not reaching mastery levels, then additional measures of performance and controls will need to be incorporated into the computer managed instruction.

## **4.2. Demonstration**

Because this is the first phase of an SBIR project, the amount of resources allocated to developing course materials were not sufficient to implement the full demonstration on a computer. Consequently, the full demonstration package has been prepared as a paper-based storyboard with some notations indicating potential improvements which could be made with a computer managed instruction approach. Additionally, the number of repetitions per enabling learning objective (ELO) have been limited in the storyboards.

In order to provide the reader with an indication of how such an approach might be implemented as a computer-based training program, the portions of the first and last modules of the storyboards have been implemented in HyperCard for the Macintosh. While the computer demonstration does not have all the sophistication which is possible (keeping score, tests for mastery of material, automatic branching to tailor the presentation to the trainee's needs), it does provide the viewer with the impression of some of the possibilities of a computer implementation.

Both the paper storyboards and the computer implementation have instructions incorporated in them. The computer requires some minimal understanding of the Macintosh interface, and the storyboards require a presenter to manipulate the materials for the trainee. Within the storyboards the square brackets, [], contain instructions to the presenter of the materials. Occasionally, the storyboards contain notes to the evaluators of the storyboards. These notes identify some advanced feature which would be particularly helpful to implement in a full scale development training package or they point out some particularly interesting features of the storyboards. The notes are easily identified because they appear in a box and are printed in italics.

## **5. PATTERN RECOGNITION CHARACTERISTICS DEMONSTRATED**

The purpose of this section is to highlight the characteristics of the pattern recognition approach which are exemplified in the attached storyboards. The most central theme in the pattern recognition approach to training is the acquisition of the ability to detect patterns in a problem situation--patterns which enable experts to solve problems.

### **5.1. Patterns as Learning Objectives**

During the performance of intellectual tasks, people construct mental models of the information with which they interact. Ortega (1989) provided several examples of how experts use mental models. Programmers appear to organize lines of code according to the deep structure of the program rather than the surface features of the syntax. Physicists organize information in physics problems around physics principles rather than around the surface features of the problem presentation. As users of text editors gain experience, they seem to use the features of the text editor differently. They begin by using the commands



individually based on the natural language meaning of the commands, and then they progress to a point where they are executing complex plans which incorporate several commands in combination.

While it seems probable that everyone uses mental models to solve problems, the mental models of experts are of primary concern to the pattern recognition approach to training. These mental models (or patterns) appear to enable the expert to organize the information in the problem presentation to facilitate the development of a solution. In other words, part of becoming an expert is developing the ability to construct appropriate mental models--to see appropriate patterns--for solving difficult problems. For instance, when an expert views a complete situation map depicting enemy organizations and positions, he constructs a number of patterns. If the situation map depicts a detailed view of locations at the platoon level, he is able to construct an overview model. While he may not actually draw the overview model on paper, he still uses such a model as a thinking tool. Conversely, when shown a less detailed view, he is able to superimpose a doctrinal view of the subordinate organizations for the situation at hand. Again, the subordinate units may never be explicitly drawn, but the ability to construct these patterns mentally provides the expert with a valuable thinking tool. He is also able to recognize patterns in locations and movements of units which indicate particular tactics which are being implemented. This, in turn, provides him with an entire configuration (pattern) of implications for his own responses to the situation.

The most noticeable difference between this demonstration and other computer-based training is the concentration on these patterns (mental models) used by experts in the performance of their jobs. The learning objectives of a pattern recognition program are formulated around these patterns, and they are explicitly presented to the trainee. For each training module within the demonstration package, the patterns are explicitly presented under the headings of "Pattern Prototype Presentation" and "Review." While other types of training provides much of this information, they usually don't provide the trainee with much practice at establishing and using these patterns. Advanced pattern recognition training exercises will have the trainee reacting as a commander or staff officer in a realistic battlefield situation. The format of the pattern presentation is as similar to those of a battlefield situation as possible.


The sources of the patterns in the attached demonstration package are reference books and course materials for TCDC. More advanced lessons will probably require consultations with successful battalion commanders to derive more refined patterns. While the patterns have been derived from existing training materials, there are some important differences between the patterns and their sources. First, textual materials have been translated into a representation form which is more recognizable to a commander and his staff (typically, a diagram using military symbology). While textbooks do contain a large number of graphics, the pattern recognition lessons contain even more graphics.

Another important difference is that, while traditional materials often provide a single example of the important teaching concepts, the pattern recognition approach presents a number of examples. One of the tenets of the pattern

recognition approach is that the patterns used by experts are best understood as categories of patterns. A single meaningful pattern for organizing a problem may be represented by any of one an uncountable number of specific examples. For instance, the pattern of "a Soviet motorized rifle regiment in march formation while anticipating a meeting engagement" could be represented by any one of a large number of situation maps. The position that the patterns are best viewed as categories is supported by the fact that Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) describe concept formation as the act of categorization.

## 5.2. Patterns as Categories

Because the teaching objective is the acquisition of a category, or the ability to categorize, the practice presentations of the demonstration package differ from those normally encountered elsewhere. There are basically three types of presentation in the demonstration package which emphasize the categorical nature of the patterns to be learned.



### 5.2.1. Identifying Variations of the Prototype

The first is illustrated in Figure 1. Here, the pattern prototype is presented as clearly as possible. Subsequently, practice stimuli are shown which the trainee judges as being examples of the pattern or not. After each judgement, the trainee is informed whether his judgement is correct. If it is incorrect, he is provided the reason why it is incorrect. After the trainee is exposed to a set of practice stimuli, he is shown a review, which includes another presentation of the

pattern prototype. Educators may recognize these steps as the higher level events in Gagne's (1970) components of instruction (training, stimulus, feedback, remediation, and review).

Like a number of textbook presentations, the presentation of the prototype in Figure 1 depicts a clear example of a concept. Most textbooks stop at this point. Pattern recognition, on the other hand, continues to present additional stimuli for the trainee to practice judging whether they are good examples of the concept. This enables the trainee to identify the critical properties of the concept based on feedback. Without the feedback from a number of trials in Figure 1, a number of properties could be critical: rectangles as objects, the relative position of the objects to one another, the size of the objects, etc.





Figure 2. Some exercises require the trainee to identify which parts of the pattern prototype are missing.

#### 5.2.2. Identifying Missing Elements of the Prototype

The second type of presentation emphasizes the categorical nature of the patterns being taught by displaying the pattern prototype followed by practice stimuli which have missing parts. This type of presentation is illustrated in Figure 2. Again, the trainee is being given practice at identifying critical features of the pattern being learned.





### 5.2.3. Assigning Examples to Prototypes

Finally, when there are a number of related concepts, the trainee is often given practice at assigning a stimulus to one of a number of concepts. Figure 3 illustrates this situation. The initial presentation is that of three prototypes. Practice trials consist of identifying which prototype is associated with a given stimulus.

It should be noted that while these illustrations are primarily graphic, the patterns being taught are not necessarily visual--or even perceptual. They could involve complex sequences or abstract relationships such as combat power ratios. Graphic examples are used in this paper for the convenience of explaining the relationship between the prototypes and practice stimuli. The demonstration package uses a combination of text and graphics for both the pattern prototype presentations and the practice stimulus presentations.

### 5.3. Sequence Within an Exercise

The sequence within these exercises are slightly different from those described in previous deliveries for this contract. Pattern recognition training, as depicted in previous deliveries, occurs in four steps. First, a pattern is presented to the trainee. Second, the trainee responds. Third, an outcome is computed. Finally, a review is presented. The initial pattern selected provides the trainee with the opportunity to apply mental models (which are constructed or derived patterns)

like those used by experts. The complexity of the response required of the trainee is correlated to the level of the trainee's experience. When the pattern recognition approach to training is implemented as a computer managed training package, an outcome can be computed. Computation of the outcome is based on the situation depicted in the initial presentation and the trainee's response. Finally, a review is presented which identifies the quality of the trainee's response and presents him with an explicit reminder of the patterns (mental models) used by experts when responding to a similar situation.

Previous deliveries under this contract outlined the characteristics unique to pattern recognition training. Pattern recognition training offers a unique contribution as a practical exerciser by providing the trainee with opportunities to apply principles he has learned from classes and from books. More importantly, the pattern recognition approach can also be applied to the original presentation of the material. In order to allow the demonstration to be a complete presentation (not requiring an accompanying book or lecture), the "Pattern Prototype Presentation" feature was added which wasn't identified in previous deliveries under this contract. Consequently, there are five basic steps:

- pattern prototype presentation
- stimulus presentation
- trainee response
- outcome
- review

#### **5.3.1. Pattern Prototype Presentation**

The pattern prototype presentation is the initial presentation of the training objectives to the trainee. In this sense, it is similar to a number of other computer-based training approaches. However, it has unique aspects in the sense that the mental models (patterns) used by experts are emphasized in the presentation--in a fashion similar to the emphasis seen in the review portion.

#### **5.3.2. Stimulus Presentation**

Because of the level at which the objectives are stated for Lesson 7 of TCDC, most of the stimulus presentations were the display of a test question and graphic, asking the trainee to 1) judge whether the stimulus is an instance of pattern, 2) identify missing parts from a pattern, or 3) identify which pattern the stimulus exemplifies (see Figures 1, 2, and 3).

More advanced lessons would have the trainee respond to a realistic situation as a battalion commander. This is illustrated in the advanced lesson.

### **5.3.3. Trainee Response**

Because of the anticipated presentation medium (paper storyboard), the trainee response is kept as simple as possible. In most instances, a response consists of one selection from a multiple choice question.

### **5.3.4. Outcome**

The outcomes marked in the demonstration package are intended to be an indication of the correctness of the selected response and (occasionally) an indication about why a response was correct.

### **5.3.5. Review**

The review is a re-statement of the pattern prototypes which are required to perform the exercises properly.

## **6. PATTERN RECOGNITION CHARACTERISTICS NOT DEMONSTRATED IN THIS PACKAGE**

A number of characteristics which could have been included in a pattern recognition training package were not incorporated in the demonstration package. There were two reasons for not incorporating them:

- The materials were developed as a portion of a Phase I SBIR (which has a maximum time frame of six months), and there was insufficient development time to develop some of the more involved features.
- Some of the features listed below did not seem applicable to the teaching objectives for Lesson 7 of TCDC.

The following paragraphs identify some of the features which could be a part of future pattern recognition training packages, but were not incorporated in this demonstration package.

### **6.1. Extensive Amounts of Repetition for Each Pattern**

The implementation idea of Battlemaster is that an individual can interact with the computer-based training package at any time in order to build a large experience base and to build concepts to the point of automaticity. The stimulus set should be very large—much larger than if the entire computer-based stimulus set were to be an integral portion of a particular course. In this respect, the stimulus set for this demonstration has far fewer examples for practice than a complete system. While most people find this small number of practice sets adequate for the concepts involved, a larger set ensures that any given individual has an ample number of unique practice drills for any pattern he finds particularly difficult to master.

## **6.2. Animation**

Animation is not shown or represented. However, notations have been made where animation would be of value in the establishment of patterns. Animation can be particularly valuable when the trainee needs to identify patterns which consist of sequences of events.

## **6.3. Analysis of Response Decision Tree**

In the course of performing their duties, commanders and staff often make interdependent, sequential decisions. This interdependency is often important to the pattern recognition approach to training. In these training situations, the nature of each presentation is dependent on prior responses. This type of training is not evident in this demonstration for two reasons: 1) the concepts being taught did not involve interdependent, sequential decisions, and 2) the complex branching required for this approach would have been difficult to describe and to manage with storyboards. The lack of this type of interaction is also the reason why the outcomes in the demonstration package are a discussion of the correctness or incorrectness of the response, rather than a computation of the effect of the response on the original situation presented to the trainee.

## **6.4. Group Training**

Group training is not presented in this demonstration because the concepts in this lesson are primarily individual training concepts. Collective tasks were not among the training objectives. Furthermore, the management of group training is quite complex and would have exceeded the developmental resources of the Phase I SBIR.

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## **Appendix A**

### **BATTLEMASTER STORYBOARDS**

#### **2. ANALYZE SOVIET GROUND FORCES (TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE B.)**

This pattern recognition training demonstration package is designed to familiarize you with Soviet motorized rifle regiment offensive tactics. There are three primary categories of such tactics: attack of a defending enemy, meeting engagement, and pursuit. The demonstration package addresses the attack of a defending enemy and the meeting engagement.

##### **2.1. Explain the Soviet Concept of "Attack of a Defending Enemy" (Enabling Learning Objective B.01)**

###### **2.1.1. Methods of Conducting Attack**

The purpose of this first module is to familiarize you with Soviet methods of conducting attack against a defending enemy and the conditions under which each method will most probably be used. When you have completed this lesson, you will be able to identify two Soviet methods of conducting an attack: attack from the march and attack from a position in direct contact. You will also be able to identify conditions which favor one method over the other.

### Pattern Prototype Presentation

The attack against a defending enemy is employed when the enemy is in a defensive position, and the Soviets know his location. The two methods are attack from the march and attack from a position in direct contact.




Figure 2.1.1-1.

The attack from the march is generally the preferred method of attack, and it is launched from march formation out of assembly areas in the rear. The Soviets perceive the advantages of the attack from the march to be as follows:

- The unit is not committed before attack.
- The attack increases chance of surprise, allows greater flexibility, decreases vulnerability to enemy artillery, and enhances momentum.

The disadvantages of the attack from the march are:

- Commanders may not be familiar with terrain and enemy dispositions.
- It is more difficult to coordinate fire and maneuver and simultaneous combined arms efforts.




Figure 2.1.1-2.

An attack from a position in direct contact is generally the less preferred method. It is launched from a position which may be a part of a defensive position, and is most often used when changing over to the offense from the defense. The advantages of an attack from a position in direct contact are as follows:

- It allows more thorough study of terrain and enemy disposition.
- It permits a more refined organization for battle.
- It is easier to coordinate fire and maneuver.

The disadvantages of an attack from a position in direct contact are:

- Unit may be already committed.
- Unit is under threat of attack during preparation.
- There is less chance of surprise.
- There is less chance to build up momentum and to overcome inertia.



### Stimulus Presentation

[No figure is displayed.]

Assuming you have no other information than "the Soviets will attack," which is the preferred Soviet method of conducting an attack of a defending enemy?

- a. attack from the march
- b. attack from a position in direct contact

### Response

[Trainee selects "a" or "b".]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select "a" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.1.1-1.

The correct option is "a," because the attack from the march is the generally preferred method of attack. The Soviets perceive the advantages of the attack from the march to be as follows:

- The unit is not committed before attack.
- The attack increases chance of surprise, allows greater flexibility, decreases vulnerability to enemy artillery, and enhances momentum.




Figure 2.1.1-3.

Looking at the combat information in Figure 2.1.1-3, identify the preferred Soviet method of conducting an attack of a defending enemy:

- a. attack from the march
- b. attack from a position in direct contact

Response

[Trainee selects "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[If trainee selects "a," then...]




Figure 2.1.1-1.

Correct. With no additional combat information, attacking from the march is the preferred method because:

- The unit is not committed before the attack.
- The attack increases the chance of surprise.
- The attack allows greater flexibility.
- The attack decreases vulnerability to enemy artillery.
- The attack enhances momentum.

[If the trainee selects b, then...]




Figure 2.1.1-1.

Incorrect. With no additional combat information, attacking from the march is the preferred method because:

- The unit is not committed before the attack.
- The attack increases the chance of surprise.
- The attack allows greater flexibility.
- The attack decreases vulnerability to enemy artillery
- The attack enhances momentum.

In order for the attack from a position in direct contact to be preferred, some combination of the following conditions should exist:

- Soviet commander is not familiar with the terrain and enemy dispositions.
- Coordination is difficult for fire and maneuver and simultaneous combined arms efforts.
- A refined organization for battle is needed.

### Stimulus Presentation

[No figure is displayed.]

The Soviet commander is in unfamiliar territory, and has difficulty coordinating a combined arms effort. Which method of attack is most probable?

- a. attack from the march
- b. attack from a position in direct contact

### Response

[Trainee selects "a" or "b."]

## Outcome

[If trainee selects a, then...]

... Incorrect. The disadvantages of the attack from the march in this situation are:

- Commanders may not be familiar with terrain and enemy dispositions.
- It is more difficult to coordinate fire and maneuver and simultaneous combined arms efforts.

... While attacking from the march is generally the preferred Soviet approach, the specific disadvantages in the situation to the Soviet commander make this an especially risky method of attack.

[If the trainee selects b, then...]

... Correct. The disadvantages experienced by the Soviet commander make attacking from the march especially risky. Therefore, attacking from a position in direct contact is preferred.

... The advantages of an attack from a position in direct contact are:

- It allows more thorough study of terrain and enemy disposition.
- It permits a more refined organization for battle.
- It is easier to coordinate fire and maneuver.



Stimulus Presentation




Figure 2.1.1-4

Using the information depicted in this graphic, identify the Soviet method of conducting an attack of a defending enemy:

- a. attack from the march
- b. attack from a position in direct contact

Response

[Trainee selects "a" or "b".]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select "b" for a correct answer.]

[If the trainee selects "b" then...]




Figure 2.1.1-2.

Correct. Since the Soviets are already deployed, there is little choice but to attack from a position in direct contact.

[If the trainee selects "a" then...]




Figure 2.1.1-2.

Incorrect. Since the Soviets are already deployed, there is little choice but to attack from a position in direct contact. An attack from a position in direct contact is launched from a position which may be a part of a defensive position, and is most often used when changing over to the offense from the defense.

*More advanced exercises would involve graphic evidence of some of the consideration factors for attack from direct contact vs. attack from the march. For instance, poor fire support coordination might be indicated by a badly positioned artillery battalion, and the lack of Soviet familiarity with territory might be indicated by having a battalion sized unit go through a narrow valley when a better path is obvious (to someone who knows the terrain).*

### Review

The attack against a defending enemy is employed when the enemy is in a defensive position, and the Soviets know his location. The two methods are attack from the march and attack from a position in direct contact.




Figure 2.1.1-1.

The attack from the march is generally the preferred method of attack, and it is launched from march formation out of assembly areas in the rear. The Soviets perceive the advantages of the attack from the march to be as follows:

- The unit is not committed before attack.
- The attack increases chance of surprise, allows greater flexibility, decreases vulnerability to enemy artillery, and enhances momentum.

The disadvantages of the attack from the march are:

- Commanders may not be familiar with terrain and enemy dispositions.
- It is more difficult to coordinate fire and maneuver and simultaneous combined arms efforts.




Figure 2.1.1-2.

An attack from a position in direct contact is generally the less preferred method. It is launched from a position which may be a part of a defensive position, and is most often used when changing over to the offense from the defense. The advantages of an attack from a position in direct contact are as follows:

- It allows more thorough study of terrain and enemy disposition.
- It permits a more refined organization for battle.
- It is easier to coordinate fire and maneuver.

The disadvantages of an attack from a position in direct contact are:

- Unit may be already committed.
- Unit is under threat of attack during preparation.
- There is less chance of surprise.
- There is less chance to build up momentum and to overcome inertia.

### 2.1.2. Forms of Maneuver

The purpose of this exercise is to familiarize you with Soviet forms of maneuver and the required combined arms coordination at the Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) level.

#### 2.1.2.1. FORMS OF MANEUVER--HIGH LEVEL VIEW

This module addresses these ideas with high-level graphics. You will learn to recognize high-level graphic representations of the three forms of Soviet maneuver, and you will be able to identify some fire support coordination considerations associated with them.

##### Pattern Prototype Presentation

The three forms of Soviet maneuver are frontal attack, flank attack, and envelopment.




Figure 2.1.2-1.

The frontal attack is directed against the enemy's front line forces to penetrate his defenses along single or multiple axes. The frontal attack by itself is the least preferred form of maneuver. Normally, it is used in combination with a flank attack or an envelopment.




Figure 2.1.2-1.2

The envelopment is a deeper attack that causes the enemy to turn and fight in a new direction. It is launched against enemy open flanks or through gaps or breaches. There is no requirement for mutual fire support with forces conducting a frontal attack.




Figure 2.1.2-1.1.

The flank attack is conducted to strike enemy forces in their flank or rear at a relatively shallow depth. It normally is initiated through gaps or breaches in enemy formations. Forces conducting the flank attack and those conducting a simultaneous frontal attack coordinate mutual fire support.



Initial Stimulus Presentation




Figure 2.1.2-4.

Which form(s) of maneuver are represented in this figure?

- a. frontal attack
- b. flank attack
- c. envelopment
- d. frontal attack and flank attack
- e. frontal attack and envelopment

Response

[The trainee responds with "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

Trainee must select "d" to get a correct response. If he selects another combination, he is informed that it is incorrect.

Will forces conducting the flank attack and those conducting a simultaneous frontal attack need to coordinate mutual fire support?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[Trainee selects "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[Trainee must select "a" to get a correct response. If he selects another answer, he is informed that it is incorrect.]




Figure 2.1.2-5

Which form(s) of maneuver are represented in this figure?

- a. frontal attack
- b. flank attack
- c. envelopment
- d. frontal attack and flank attack
- e. frontal attack and envelopment

### Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[Trainee must select "e" to get a correct response. If he selects another combination, he is informed that it is incorrect.]

Will forces conducting the envelopment normally require mutual fire support with those forces conducting the frontal attack?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[Trainee selects "a" or "b."]

Outcome

[Trainee must select "b" to get a correct response.]





Figure 2.1.2-6. [This is a double size figure.]

Which diagram shows the preferred Soviet form of maneuver?


- a. option A (see figure)
- b. option B (see figure)

Response


[Trainee selects "a" or "b."]

Outcome

[Trainee must select "b" to get a correct response. If he selects another answer, he is informed that it is incorrect.]



**OPTION A**



**OPTION B**

Figure 2.1.2-7. [This is a double size figure.]

Which diagram shows the preferred Soviet form of maneuver?

- a. option A (see figure)
- b. option B (see figure)



### Response

[Trainee selects "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[Trainee must select "a" to get a correct response. If he selects another answer, he is informed that it is incorrect.]

### Review

The three forms of Soviet maneuver are frontal attack, flank attack, and envelopment.




Figure 2.1.2-1.

The frontal attack is directed against the enemy's front line forces to penetrate his defenses along single or multiple axes. The frontal attack by itself is the least preferred form of maneuver. Normally, it is used in combination with a flank attack or an envelopment.




Figure 2.1.2-1.1.

The flank attack is conducted to strike enemy forces in their flank or rear at a relatively shallow depth. It normally is initiated through gaps or breaches in enemy formations. Forces conducting the flank attack and those conducting a simultaneous frontal attack coordinate mutual fire support.




Figure 2.1.2-1.2

The envelopment is a deeper attack that causes the enemy to turn and fight in a new direction. It is launched against enemy open flanks or through gaps or breaches. There is no requirement for mutual fire support with forces conducting a frontal attack.



#### 2.1.2.2. FORMS OF MANEUVER--SYMBOLGY VIEW

*Note: Pattern recognition lessons are intended to be stair-stepped (correlated to the learner's level of training). The initial presentations which would resemble material covered in class would have a slightly different appearance from that which is strictly a practical exerciser. Most modules in this demonstration package illustrate initial presentations. The following module (2.1.2.2.) should illustrate the appearance of a practical exerciser for material which has been presented in earlier lessons. It requires the trainee to synthesize the information which he has been given in previous lessons.*

*The materials in this symbology module demonstrate exercises only with the flank attack. However, it should be apparent how exercises with frontal attack and envelopment would be conducted.*

*It should also be noted that the dashed lines in these drawings imply movement. This is an example where an animated presentation could be of some value. The patterns being developed are the terrain features and distance at which the tank battalion deploys into companies and the routes taken by the frontal and flanking attack. The potential benefits of the animation is that it allows the trainee to anticipate points of deployment and movement paths at each stage of development and then see the path taken immediately afterwards.*

The purpose of this exercise is to provide you with additional practice at identifying Soviet forms of maneuver and the associated considerations for employing each form at the motorized rifle regiment level. This exercise will provide you with practice in using and recognizing these forms of maneuver through symbology. In order to make the symbology resemble that which you will use as a commander or as a member of the commander's staff, Soviet units are designated with U.S. symbology, but with double boxes.



2.1.2-8

A Soviet tank battalion is attacking from the march. The Soviet commander is familiar with the terrain and has a history of good fire support coordination. Except for the terrain features marked on the map, the terrain consists of clear, flat, grassy plains. The weather is clear, and visibility is quite good. Enemy defenses are well-established and formidable.

Which form(s) of maneuver are depicted in this diagram?

- a. frontal attack
- b. flank attack
- c. envelopment
- d. frontal attack and flank attack
- e. frontal attack and envelopment

Response

[Trainee responds with "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select "d" for a correct answer.]

Re-present Figure 2.1.2-8

Identify the feature that is different from a typical flank attack?

- a. nothing
- b. terrain features do not favor this action
- c. the wrong allocation of units to frontal and flank attacks

Response



[Trainee responds with "a," "b," or "c."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select "a" for a correct answer.]

Option "a" is the correct answer. Two tank companies and a motorized rifle company are conducting the frontal attack, with a tank company attacking on a flank from behind natural terrain concealment.

2.1.2-9



A Soviet tank battalion is attacking from the march. The Soviet commander is familiar with the terrain and has a history of good fire support coordination. Except for the terrain features marked on the map, the terrain consists of clear, flat, grassy plains. The weather is clear, and visibility is quite good. Enemy defenses are well-established and formidable. Identify the feature that is different from a typical flank attack.

- a. nothing
- b. terrain features do not favor this action
- c. the wrong allocation of units to frontal and flank attacks

Response

[Trainee responds with "a," "b," or "c."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select "b" for a correct answer.]

The correct answer is "b." The natural concealment is no longer present, removing the advantage of the surprise for the flanking element.



Review




Figure 2.1.2-1.1.

The flank attack is conducted to strike enemy forces in their flank or rear at a relatively shallow depth. It normally is initiated through gaps or breaches in enemy formations. Forces conducting the flank attack and those conducting a simultaneous frontal attack coordinate mutual fire support.

### 2.1.2.3. FORMS OF MANEUVER--EQUIPMENT VIEW

*Note: Exercises involving an equipment view appear to be at either a more advanced level or a more elementary level than the learning objectives for the current lesson. The more elementary level involves practice at matching equipment to types of units in the fashion of a Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). The more advanced exercises would involve matching partial equipment sightings with probable forms of maneuver. Although an example of this more advanced exercise does NOT follow for forms of maneuver, a similar lesson DOES follow for march formations (see paragraph 2.2.2.3).*

The purpose of this exercise is to familiarize you with Soviet forms of maneuver and the required combined arms coordination at the motorized rifle regiment level through the association of detailed graphics of Soviet equipment to the forms of maneuver.. This third set addresses these ideas with more detailed graphics which include more Soviet equipment representations.

### 2.1.3. Planning Considerations

#### 2.1.3.1. MOVEMENT CONTROL

*This module was not completed due to limitations in development time.*

*It should be noted that this is another place where animation could prove to be a valuable addition. Animation could show a rapid unfolding of events which must take place during large troop movements. Action sequences can be stopped so that the trainee can practice anticipating the next event in the sequence.*

#### 2.1.3.2. USE OF ASSEMBLY AREAS

*This module was not completed due to limitations in development time.*

#### 2.1.3.3. OPTIONS AND VARIATIONS IN ECHELON ARRAY

The purpose of this exercise is to familiarize you with the more typical options and variations in the echelon array of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment (MRR) during the attack of a defending enemy. When you finish with this module, you will be able to identify typical Soviet MRR echelon arrays.

##### Pattern Prototype Presentation

A maneuver regiment is the smallest fully combined arms ground force element. It is capable of limited independent action, but normally attacks as a part of a parent division. A regiment normally is organized for combat into three reinforced battalions and, possibly, a company-sized reserve. A motorized rifle regiment (MRR) has three motorized rifle battalions and one tank battalion. The subunits of the tank battalion normally are assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions. The MRR normally attacks with most of its combat power in a first echelon, with the remaining forces organized into a second echelon. Here are two typical examples:




Figure 2.1.3.3-7.

The motorized rifle regiment normally attacks with two reinforced battalions in its first echelon, and one reinforced battalion in a second echelon.




Figure 2.1.3.3-7.1

A regiment could also attack with three battalions in a single echelon with a reserve of one or two companies.

Stimulus Presentation

**MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT ECHELONS**




Figure 2.1.3.3-1.

Is this a typical echelon array for a Soviet motorized rifle regiment attacking a defending enemy?

- a. yes
- b. no

Response

[The trainee response either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[If yes...]

... Incorrect. While this is certainly an option, the subunits of the tank battalion are normally assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions.

[If no...]

... Correct. While this array is certainly an option, the subunits of the tank battalion are normally assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions.

### **MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT ECHELONS**




Figure 2.1.3.3-2

Is this a typical echelon array for a Soviet motorized rifle regiment attacking a defending enemy?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[The trainee response either "a" or "b."]

Outcome

[If yes...]

... Incorrect. While this array is certainly an option, the subunits of the tank battalion are normally assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions.

[If no...]

... Correct. While this array is certainly an option, the subunits of the tank battalion are normally assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions.

**MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT ECHELONS**




Figure 2.1.3.3-3

Is this a typical echelon array for a Soviet motorized rifle regiment attacking a defending enemy?

- a. yes
- b. no

Response

[The trainee response either "a" or "b."]



### Outcome

[If yes...]

... Incorrect. The bulk of the combat power is normally assigned to the first echelon. In addition, the subunits of the tank battalion are normally assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions.

[If no...]

... Correct. The bulk of the combat power is normally assigned to the first echelon. In addition, the subunits of the tank battalion are normally assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions.

### **MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT ECHELONS**




Figure 2.1.3.3-4

Is this a typical echelon array for a Soviet motorized rifle regiment attacking a defending enemy?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[The trainee response either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[If yes...]

... Incorrect. The bulk of the first echelon of motorized rifle regiment normally consists of motorized rifle organizations. Also, the subunits of the tank battalion are normally assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions.

[If no...]

... Correct. The bulk of the first echelon of motorized rifle regiment normally consists of motorized rifle organizations. Also, the subunits of the tank battalion are normally assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions.

### **MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT ECHELONS**




Figure 2.1.3.3-5

Is this a typical echelon array for a Soviet motorized rifle regiment attacking a defending enemy?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[The trainee response either "a" or "b."]

Outcome

[If yes...]

... Incorrect. There is normally a second echelon.

[If no...]

... Correct. There is normally a second echelon.




Figure 2.1.3.3-7.1

Is this a typical echelon array for a Soviet motorized rifle regiment attacking a defending enemy?

- a. yes
- b. no

Response

[The trainee response either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[If yes...]

... Correct. One of the most common echelon arrays is for a regiment to attack with three battalions in a single echelon with a reserve of one or two companies.

[If no...]

... Incorrect. One of the most common echelon arrays is for a regiment to attack with three battalions in a single echelon with a reserve of one or two companies.




Figure 2.1.3.3-7

Is this a typical echelon array for a Soviet motorized rifle regiment attacking a defending enemy?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[The trainee response either "a" or "b."]



### Outcome

[If yes...]

... Correct. One of the most common echelon arrays is for the motorized rifle regiment to attack with two reinforced battalions in its first echelon, and one reinforced battalion in a second echelon.

[If no...]

... Incorrect. One of the most common echelon arrays is for the motorized rifle regiment to attack with two reinforced battalions in its first echelon, and one reinforced battalion in a second echelon.



2.1.3.3-8

Figure 2.1.3.3-8. shows a detailed view of a motorized rifle regiment with no markings for battalion boundaries or echelons. Which view is the higher level view of the sample picture?

- a. option A (see figure)
- b. option B (see figure)
- c. option C (see figure)

Response

[The trainee response "a", "b", or "c."]


### Outcome

[Option "b" is required for a correct answer.]

[If an incorrect option is selected, display Figure 2.1.3.3-9 (with boundary and echelon markings) and re-ask the question. If trainee still gets an incorrect answer...]

... Incorrect. Option "b" is the correct answer. The typical way of solving this question is to group the smaller units (companies, shown in the sample drawing) into the larger units (battalions, shown in the options). Since some distance separates the second echelon from the first, it is easier to identify the composition of the section echelon first. It has three motorized rifle companies, two of which are reinforced by tanks. The only option which has a motorized rifle battalion (three companies) reinforced by tanks is option "b."





Is Figure 2.1.3.3-9. a normal echelon array for a motorized rifle regiment attacking a defending enemy?

- a. yes
- b. no

Response

[The trainee response either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[If yes...]

... Correct. One of the most common echelon arrays is for the motorized rifle regiment to attack with two reinforced battalions in its first echelon, and one reinforced battalion in a second echelon.

[If no...]

... Incorrect. One of the most common echelon arrays is for the motorized rifle regiment to attack with two reinforced battalions in its first echelon, and one reinforced battalion in a second echelon.

*Note: A number of additional variations on Figures 2.1.3.3-8 and 2.1.3.3-9 would be very good drill and practice. This type of drill (to the level of automaticity) would provide the trainee with a required sub-skill for identifying major Soviet organizations from partial sightings and incomplete situation reports.*

### Review

A maneuver regiment is the smallest fully combined arms ground force element. It is capable of limited independent action, but normally attacks as a part of a parent division. A regiment normally is organized for combat into three reinforced battalions and, possibly, a company-sized reserve. A motorized rifle regiment (MRR) has three motorized rifle battalions and one tank battalion. The subunits of the tank battalion normally are assigned to the three motorized rifle battalions. The MRR normally attacks with most of its combat power in a first echelon, with the remaining forces organized into a second echelon. Here are two typical examples:




Figure 2.1.3.3-7.

The motorized rifle regiment normally attacks with two reinforced battalions in its first echelon, and one reinforced battalion in a second echelon.




Figure 2.1.3.3-7.1

A regiment could also attack with three battalions in a single echelon with a reserve of one or two companies.

#### 2.1.3.4. ATTACK FRONTAGES

The following module should familiarize you with common attack frontages and distances in the echelon array of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment when attacking a defending enemy.

##### Pattern Prototype Presentation




Figure 2.1.3.4-1.1.

A motorized rifle regiment's zone of attack can vary from about 3 to 8 kilometers, depending on the attack concept and the situation. The most common attack frontage of a regiment is 4 to 5 kilometers. The distance between echelons can vary from about 5 to 15 kilometers. The distance from the FEBA and the rear of the first echelon usually varies from 3 to 5 kilometers.




Figure 2.1.3.4-1.

Identify the distances which do not conform to typical motorized rifle regiment frontages and echelon distances.

- a. the frontage is too wide
- b. the frontage is too narrow
- c. the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too long
- d. the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too short
- e. the distance to the rear of the second echelon is too long
- f. the distance to the rear of the second echelon is too short
- g. all distances are O.K.

Response

[The trainee responds with "a," "b," "c," "d," "e," "f," or "g."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must respond with "g" for a correct answer.]

[If he provides an incorrect answer...]




Figure 2.1.3.4-1.1.

... A motorized rifle regiment's zone of attack can vary from about 3 to 8 kilometers, depending on the attack concept and the situation. The most common attack frontage of a regiment is 4 to 5 kilometers. The distance between echelons can vary from about 5 to 15 kilometers. The distance from the FEBA and the rear of the first echelon usually varies from 3 to 5 kilometers.






Figure 2.1.3.4-2.

Identify the distances which do not conform to typical motorized rifle regiment frontages and echelon distances.

- the frontage is too wide
- the frontage is too narrow
- the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too long
- the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too short
- the distance to the rear of the second echelon is too long
- the distance to the rear of the second echelon is too short
- all distances are O.K.

Response

[The trainee responds with "a," "b," "c," "d," "e," "f," or "g."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must respond with "b" for a correct answer.]

[If he provides an incorrect answer...]




Figure 2.1.3.4-1.1.

... A motorized rifle regiment's zone of attack can vary from about 3 to 8 kilometers, depending on the attack concept and the situation. The most common attack frontage of a regiment is 4 to 5 kilometers. The distance between echelons can vary from about 5 to 15 kilometers. The distance from the FEBA and the rear of the first echelon usually varies from 3 to 5 kilometers.

## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT ECHELON




Figure 2.1.3.4-3.

Identify the distances which do not conform to typical motorized rifle regiment frontages and echelon distances.

- a. the frontage is too wide
- b. the frontage is too narrow
- c. the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too long
- d. the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too short
- e. the distance to the rear of the second echelon is too long
- f. the distance to the rear of the second echelon is too short
- g. all distances are O.K.

### Response

[The trainee responds with "a," "b," "c," "d," "e," "f," or "g."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must respond with "d" for a correct answer.]

[If he provides an incorrect answer...]




Figure 2.1.3.4-1.1.

... A motorized rifle regiment's zone of attack can vary from about 3 to 8 kilometers, depending on the attack concept and the situation. The most common attack frontage of a regiment is 4 to 5 kilometers. The distance between echelons can vary from about 5 to 15 kilometers. The distance from the FEBA and the rear of the first echelon usually varies from 3 to 5 kilometers.




Figure 2.1.3.4-4.

Identify the distances which do not conform to typical motorized rifle regiment frontages and echelon distances.

- a. the frontage is too wide
- b. the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too long
- c. the distance to the rear of the second echelon is too long
- d. the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too short
- e. both "b" and "c" above
- f. "a," "b," and "c" above
- g. all distances are O.K.

#### Response

[The trainee responds with "a," "b," "c," "d," "e," "f," or "g."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must respond with "f" for a correct answer.]

[If he provides an incorrect answer...]




Figure 2.1.3.4-1.1.

... A motorized rifle regiment's zone of attack can vary from about 3 to 8 kilometers, depending on the attack concept and the situation. The most common attack frontage of a regiment is 4 to 5 kilometers. The distance between echelons can vary from about 5 to 15 kilometers. The distance from the FEBA and the rear of the first echelon usually varies from 3 to 5 kilometers.




Figure 2.1.3.4-5.

Identify the distances which do not conform to typical motorized rifle regiment frontages and echelon distances.

- a. the frontage is too narrow
- b. the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too short
- c. the distance to the rear of the second echelon is too short
- d. the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too long
- e. both "b" and "c" above
- f. "a," "b," and "c" above
- g. all distances are O.K.

Response

[The trainee responds with "a," "b," "c," "d," "e," "f," or "g."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must respond with "f" for a correct answer.]

[If he provides an incorrect answer...]




Figure 2.1.3.4-1.1.

... A motorized rifle regiment's zone of attack can vary from about 3 to 8 kilometers, depending on the attack concept and the situation. The most common attack frontage of a regiment is 4 to 5 kilometers. The distance between echelons can vary from about 5 to 15 kilometers. The distance from the FEBA and the rear of the first echelon usually varies from 3 to 5 kilometers.





Identify the distances which do not conform to typical motorized rifle regiment frontages and echelon distances.

- a. the frontage is too wide
- b. the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too long
- c. the distance to the rear of the second echelon is too long
- d. the distance to the rear of the first echelon is too short
- e. both "b" and "c" above
- f. "a," "b," and "c" above
- g. all distances are O.K.

Response

[The trainee responds with "a," "b," "c," "d," "e," "f," or "g."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must respond with "g" for a correct answer.]

[If he provides an incorrect answer...]




Figure 2.1.3.4-1.1.

... A motorized rifle regiment's zone of attack can vary from about 3 to 8 kilometers, depending on the attack concept and the situation. The most common attack frontage of a regiment is 4 to 5 kilometers. The distance between echelons can vary from about 5 to 15 kilometers. The distance from the FEBA and the rear of the first echelon usually varies from 3 to 5 kilometers.

## Review

You have just learned common attack frontages and distances in the echelon array of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment when attacking a defending enemy.




Figure 2.1.3.4-1.1.

A motorized rifle regiment's zone of attack can vary from about 3 to 8 kilometers, depending on the attack concept and the situation. The most common attack frontage of a regiment is 4 to 5 kilometers. The distance between echelons can vary from about 5 to 15 kilometers. The distance from the FEBA and the rear of the first echelon usually varies from 3 to 5 kilometers.

## 2.2. Explain the Soviet Concept of "Meeting Engagement." (Enabling Learning Objective B.02)

This pattern recognition training demonstration package is designed to familiarize you with Soviet motorized rifle regiment offensive tactics. There are three primary categories of such tactics: attack of a defending enemy, meeting engagement, and pursuit. This demonstration package addresses the attack of a defending enemy and the meeting engagement.

The purpose of this exercise is to provide you with practice at identifying the characteristics of a meeting engagement from the Soviet perspective.

### 2.2.1. Identify Characteristics of a Meeting Engagement

When you have completed this module, you should be able to identify those circumstances under which a meeting engagement may occur.

#### Pattern Prototype Presentation




Figure 2.2.1-10.

The Soviet meeting engagement posture is adopted in those situations where contact with the enemy is anticipated. There are essentially four situations which favor the Soviet meeting engagement posture.

Situation 1: The beginning of a war. It could also occur at the outset of any attack when opposing forces are not in initial contact, and both assume the offensive.

Situation 2: After penetration of the enemy's forward defenses. This would involve the penetrating force meeting the defender's advancing reserve elements.

Situation 3: During pursuit. A meeting engagement is likely during counterattack by either side.

Situation 4: During counterattack. There is a strong probability that the counterattacking force could be met head-on or from the flanks by the enemy.

#### Stimulus Presentation




Figure 2.2.1-1.

This is the beginning of the war. The situation has developed rapidly. Each side has only sketchy intelligence about the other, but it appears that each side is adopting an offensive posture. Is this a situation where the Soviets (shaded arrows) will probably employ meeting engagement tactics?

- a. yes
- b. no

#### Response

[Trainee selects either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

The trainee must select "a" for a correct answer.

The correct answer is "a." The beginning of a war is one of the four situations which favor the Soviet meeting engagement posture. It could also occur at the outset of any attack when opposing forces are not in initial contact, and both assume the offensive.




Figure 2.2.1-2.

The battlefield situation is that the Soviets have considerable numerical superiority of the leading enemy elements and have begun a pursuit of those elements. While Soviet intelligence is somewhat sketchy, it would appear that there is a much larger enemy force 1 to 20 kilometers behind the withdrawing enemy force. Would you expect the Soviets to adopt a meeting engagement posture?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[Trainee selects either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

The trainee must select "a" for a correct answer.

The correct answer is "a." During pursuit is one of the four situations which favor the Soviet meeting engagement posture. A meeting engagement is likely during counterattack by either side.




Figure 2.2.1-3.

The battlefield situation is that the Soviets have deployed laterally for a frontal attack against substantial enemy defenses, and they are maneuvering for engagement in a flank attack. Both the Soviets and their enemy have considerable familiarity with the terrain and both sides appear to be coordinating fire support well. Is this a situation where the Soviets would be likely to adopt a meeting engagement posture?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[Trainee selects either "a" or "b."]



### Outcome

If the trainee's response is "a," then...

Incorrect. The Soviet meeting engagement posture is adopted in those situations where contact with the enemy is anticipated, but significant portions of the Soviet force are not yet committed. Instead, this is an instance of an attack of a defending enemy. Large portions of the Soviet force are in contact with an enemy in an obvious defensive posture.

If the trainee's response is "b," then...

Correct. This is an instance of an attack of a defending enemy. Large portions of the Soviet force are in contact with an enemy in an obvious defensive posture. The Soviet meeting engagement posture, on the other hand, is adopted in those situations where contact with the enemy is anticipated, but significant portions of the Soviet force are not yet committed.




Figure 2.2.1-4.

A large portion of Soviet forces have penetrated enemy lines and are advancing to exploit the penetration. Soviet intelligence indicates that the reserve forces might be mounting a hasty attack. Should the Soviets be expected to adopt a meeting engagement posture?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[Trainee selects either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

The correct answer is "a." After penetration of the enemy's forward defenses is one of the four situations which favor the Soviet meeting engagement posture. This would involve the penetrating force meeting the defender's advancing reserve elements.




Figure 2.2.1-5.

The battlefield situation is that Soviet forces are deployed in a frontal attack and are maneuvering for an envelopment. Their enemy doesn't have good intelligence about Soviet activities and seems to have trouble coordinating fire support. Would you expect the Soviet to adopt a meeting engagement posture?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[Trainee selects either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[If the trainee's response is "a", then...]

Incorrect. The Soviet meeting engagement posture is adopted in those situations where contact with the enemy is anticipated, but significant portions of the Soviet force are not yet committed. Instead, this is an instance of an attack of a defending enemy. Large portions of the Soviet force are in contact with an enemy in an obvious defensive posture.

[If the trainee's response is "b", then...]

Correct. This is an instance of an attack of a defending enemy. Large portions of the Soviet force are in contact with an enemy in an obvious defensive posture. The Soviet meeting engagement posture, on the other hand, is adopted in those situations where contact with the enemy is anticipated, but significant portions of the Soviet force are not yet-committed.




Figure 2.2.1-6.

The first echelon of Soviet forces are deployed laterally in a frontal attack, and enemy defenses are formidable. The Soviet's first echelon contains the majority of their combat power, and the Soviets have considerable coordination problems. Should you expect the Soviets to adopt a meeting engagement posture?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[Trainee selects either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[If the trainee's response is "a", then...]

Incorrect. The Soviet meeting engagement posture is adopted in those situations where contact with the enemy is anticipated, but significant portions of the Soviet force are not yet committed. Instead, this is an instance of an attack of a defending enemy. Large portions of the Soviet force are in contact with an enemy in an obvious defensive posture.

[If the trainee's response is "b", then...]

Correct. This is an instance of an attack of a defending enemy. Large portions of the Soviet force are in contact with an enemy in an obvious defensive posture. The Soviet meeting engagement posture, on the other hand, is adopted in those situations where contact with the enemy is anticipated, but significant portions of the Soviet force are not yet committed.




Figure 2.2.1-7.

The battlefield situation is that the Soviets have launched an attack on an enemy and surprised them. Currently, only minor Soviet forces are engaged. The enemy appears to be adopting an offensive posture and might be attempting a flank attack. Should you expect the Soviets to adopt a meeting engagement posture?

- a. yes
- b. no


### Response

[Trainee selects either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select "a" for a correct answer.]

The correct answer is "a." During counterattack is one of the four situations which favor the Soviet meeting engagement posture. There is a strong probability that the counterattacking force could be met head-on or from the flanks by the enemy.



2.1.2-8

A Soviet tank battalion is engaging an enemy in coordinated frontal and flank attacks, reinforced by indirect fires of an artillery battalion. Would you expect the tank regiment to adopt a meeting engagement posture.

- a. yes
- b. no

Response

[Trainee selects either "a" or "b."]

### Outcome

[If the trainee selects "a", then...]

Incorrect. The battlefield situation does not favor a meeting engagement posture, and the posture already adopted is not that of a meeting engagement. Instead, because contact has already been made and the enemy is defending, the battlefield situation calls for an attack of a defending enemy--which is the posture that has already been adopted.

[If the trainee selects "b," then...]

Correct. The battlefield situation does not favor a meeting engagement posture, and the posture already adopted is not that of a meeting engagement. Instead, because contact has already been made and the enemy is defending, the battlefield situation calls for an attack of a defending enemy--which is the posture that has already been adopted. -




Figure 2.2.1-9.

Does this figure depict a meeting engagement?

- a. yes
- b. no

### Response

[Trainee selects either "a" or "b."]



### Outcome

The trainee must select "a" for a correct answer.




Figure 2.2.1-9.

What are the indicators that this is a meeting engagement?

- a. the main force is attempting an envelopment rather than a frontal attack
- b. an advance guard is shown
- c. both Soviet and their opposing forces are advancing
- d. Soviet forces are coordinating for fire support
- e. both "b" and "c"

### Response

[Trainee selects either "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

## Outcome

[The trainee must select both "e" for the correct answer.]

The battlefield situation where both forces are advancing toward one another favors a meeting engagement posture, and the presence of an advance guard indicates that a meeting engagement posture has been adopted.

## Review




Figure 2.2.1-10.

The Soviet meeting engagement posture is adopted in those situations where contact with the enemy is anticipated. There are essentially four situations which favor the Soviet meeting engagement posture.

Situation 1: The beginning of a war. It could also occur at the outset of any attack when opposing forces are not in initial contact, and both assume the offensive.

Situation 2: After penetration of the enemy's forward defenses. This would involve the penetrating force meeting the defender's advancing reserve elements.

Situation 3: During pursuit. A meeting engagement is likely during counterattack by either side.

Situation 4: During counterattack. There is a strong probability that the counterattacking force could be met head-on or from the flanks by the enemy.

### 2.2.2. Identify the Elements of a March Formation

The purpose of this exercise is to provide you with practice at identifying the Soviet motorized rifle regiment in march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement.

#### 2.2.2.1. MARCH FORMATION - HIGH LEVEL VIEW

When you have finished this module, you will be able to identify the major components of the march formation and the distances which should separate those components.

##### Pattern Prototype Presentation

#### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-2.

The advance guard of a motorized rifle regiment usually consists of a motorized rifle battalion reinforced with artillery, tanks, air defense, engineer, and chemical elements.

## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-12.

The advance guard dispatches a forward security element (FSE), which in its turn dispatches a combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP). The FSE is an augmented company, and the CRP an augmented platoon.

## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11.

The main force typically has rear and flank security elements of up to platoon strength at a distance of up to 3 km from the column. The advance guard precedes the main force by a distance of 20-30 km. Within the advance guard, the FSE precedes the main body by 5-10 km, and the CRP precedes the FSE by a distance up to 10 km.

Stimulus Presentation

**MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION**




Figure 2.2.2.1-1

This is a high-level representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Please identify the features which are not characteristic of the typical march formation in this situation:

- a. Nothing is wrong with this drawing.
- b. The advance guard should be beside the main force.
- c. The positions of advance guard and the main force should be reversed.
- d. The advance guard is mislabelled; it should be called reconnaissance patrol.

Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," or "d."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select "c" for the correct answer.]

**MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION**




Figure 2.2.2.1-1

This is a high-level representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. If the drawing is to be kept as it currently appears, what would be a more appropriate label for the arrow currently named advance guard?

- a. reconnaissance patrol
- b. combat reconnaissance patrol
- c. forward security element
- d. flank security
- e. rear security

Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select "e" for the correct answer.]

**MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION**




Figure 2.2.2.1-2.

This is a high-level representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Please identify the features which are not characteristic of the typical march formation in this situation:

- a. Nothing is wrong with this drawing.
- b. The advance guard should be beside the main force.
- c. The positions of advance guard and the main force should be reversed.
- d. The advance guard is mislabelled; it should be called reconnaissance patrol.

Response

[Trainee selects "a", "b," "c", "d," or "e."]



Outcome

[The trainee must select "a" for the correct answer.]

**MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION**




Figure 2.2.2.1-3.

This is a high-level representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Please identify the features which are not characteristic of the typical march formation in this situation:

- a. Nothing is wrong with this drawing.
- b. The advance guard should be only one arrow--in front of the main force.
- c. The labels for the advance guard and main force should be reversed.
- d. The advance guard is mislabelled; it should be called reconnaissance patrol.
- e. The advance guard should be behind the main force.

Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select "b" for the correct answer.]

**MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION**




Figure 2.2.2.1-3.

This is a high-level representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. If the drawing is to be kept as it currently appears, what would be a more appropriate label for the arrow currently named advance guard?

- a. reconnaissance patrol
- b. combat reconnaissance patrol
- c. forward security element
- d. flank security
- e. rear security

Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select "d" for the correct answer.]

#### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-4.

This is a high-level representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Please identify the features which are not characteristic of the typical march formation in this situation:

- a. Nothing is wrong with this drawing.
- b. The advance guard should be in the rear.
- c. The advance guard is mislabelled; it should be called reconnaissance patrol.
- d. The distance between the advance guard and the main force is too short.
- e. The distance between the advance guard and the main force is too long.

### Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select "d" for the correct answer.]

### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11.

The correct answer is "d." The test drawing showed a distance of 2 km, whereas the standard distance between the advance guard and the main force of the MRR is 20-30 km.

## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-5.

This is a high-level representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Please identify the features which are not characteristic of the typical march formation in this situation:

- a. Nothing is wrong with this drawing.
- b. The advance guard should be in the rear.
- c. The advance guard is mislabelled; it should be called reconnaissance patrol.
- d. The distance between the advance guard and the main force is too short.
- e. The distance between the advance guard and the main force is too long.

### Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select "e" for the correct answer.]

[If he selects an incorrect answer then...]

### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11, and

... The correct answer is "e." The test drawing showed a distance of 70 km, whereas the standard distance between the advance guard and the main force of the MRR is 20-30 km.

## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-6.

This is a high-level representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Please identify the features which are not characteristic of the typical march formation in this situation:

- a. Nothing is wrong with this drawing.
- b. The advance guard should be in the rear.
- c. The advance guard is mislabelled; it should be called reconnaissance patrol.
- d. The distance between the advance guard and the main force is too short.
- e. The distance between the advance guard and the main force is too long.

### Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select "a" for the correct answer.]

[If he selects an incorrect answer then...]

### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11, and

... The correct answer is "a." The test drawing showed a distance of 25 km, whereas the standard distance between the advance guard and the main force of the MRR is 20-30 km.



## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-7.

This is a representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Please identify the features which are not characteristic of the typical march formation in this situation:

- a. Nothing is wrong with this drawing.
- b. The positions of the advance guard (main body) and forward security element (FSE) are reversed.
- c. The positions of the combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP) and the FSE are reversed.
- d. The distance between the advance guard (main body) and the FSE is too short.
- e. The distance between the FSE and the CRP is too long.

### Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select "c" for the correct answer.]

### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11.

The correct answer is "c." Notice the relative positions of the CRP, the FSE, and the advance guard main body. Also, the standard distance between the CRP and the FSE is up to 10 km and the standard distance between the FSE and the advance guard main body is 5-10 km.

## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-8.

This is a representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Please identify the features which are not characteristic of the typical march formation in this situation:

- a. Nothing is wrong with this drawing.
- b. The positions of the advance guard (main body) and forward security element (FSE) are reversed.
- c. The positions of the combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP) and the FSE are reversed.
- d. The distance between the advance guard (main body) and the FSE is too short.
- e. The distance between the FSE and the CRP is too long.

### Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select "a" for the correct answer...]

[If the trainee selects "d," then...]

Incorrect. The standard distance between the forward security element (FSE) and the main body of the advance guard is between 5 and 10 km, and 5 km is within that range.

[If the trainee selects "e," then...]

... Incorrect. The standard distance between the forward security element (FSE) and the combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP) is up to 10 km, and 8 km is within that range.

## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-9.

This is a representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Please identify the features which are not characteristic of the typical march formation in this situation:

- Nothing is wrong with this drawing.
- The positions of the advance guard main body and forward security element (FSE) are reversed.
- The positions of the combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP) and the FSE are reversed.
- The distance between the advance guard (main body) and the FSE is too short.

### Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," or "d."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select "b" for the correct answer.]

[If the trainee selects "d," then...]

Incorrect. The standard distance between the forward security element (FSE) and the main body of the advance guard is between 5 and 10 km, and 8 km is within that range.

## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-10.

This is a representation of a Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Please identify the features which are not characteristic of the typical march formation in this situation:

- Nothing is wrong with this drawing.
- The positions of the advance guard (main body) and forward security element (FSE) are reversed.
- The positions of the combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP) and the FSE are reversed.
- The distance between the advance guard (main body) and the FSE is too short.
- The distance between the FSE and the CRP is too long.

### Response

[Trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select "e" for the correct answer.]

[If the trainee selects "a," "b," or "c" ...]

### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11, and

... The correct answer is "e." Notice the relative positions of the CRP, the FSE, and the advance guard main body. Also, the standard distance between the CRP and the FSE is up to 10 km, and the standard distance between the FSE and the advance guard main body is 5-10 km.

[If the trainee selects "d," then...]



## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11, and

... Incorrect. The standard distance between the forward security element (FSE) and the main body of the advance guard is between 5 and 10 km, and 5 km is within that range.

[If the trainee selects "e," then...]

... Correct. The standard distance is up to 10 km, and 30 km is far beyond that distance.

### Review

You have just learned to identify the major components of the march formation and the distances which should separate those components.

### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11.

This is the standard organization of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) in march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. The main force is preceded by the advance guard by 20 to 30 km. The main force has two flank security forces and a rear security force, each of which are up to platoon strength and at a distance of up to 3 km from the column. The advance guard consists of three portions: the combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP), the Forward Security Element (FSE), and the advance guard (main body). The order within the advance guard is CRP, FSE, and main body. The standard distance between the CRP and the FSE is up to 10 km, and the standard distance between the FSE and main body of the advance guard is 5-10 km.

### 2.2.2.2. March Formation - Symbology View

In this module, you should learn the composition of each part of the typical Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. Specifically, you should be able to identify missing portions of the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP), the Forward Security Element (FSE), the main body of the advance guard, and the main force. You should also be able to identify these groups by their components.

#### Pattern Prototype Presentation

#### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11.

The advance guard of a Soviet MRR usually consists of a motorized rifle battalion reinforced with artillery, tanks, air defense, engineer, and chemical elements. The advance guard dispatches a forward security element (FSE), which in its turn dispatches a combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP). The FSE is an augmented company, and the CRP is an augmented platoon.

# **MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE PATROL**




Figure 2.2.2.2-1.

The CRP is a fighting patrol consisting of a motorized rifle platoon augmented with chemical/radiation and engineer reconnaissance personnel. The mission of the patrol is to provide prompt information on the enemy's strength, composition, and direction of movement. The patrol attempts to penetrate and report on the enemy main body. The patrol also reports information on routes, the radiological and chemical situation, and the nature of the terrain. The diagram shows the march formation of the elements within the CRP.

# **MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT**




Figure 2.2.2.2-6.

The FSE is normally a motorized rifle company reinforced with tanks, artillery, mortars, engineers, and chemical defense. The mission of the FSE, is to advance at a maximum speed and to engage lead enemy elements. Through use of its mobility and fire power, it seizes and holds a position advantageous for subsequent commitment of the advance guard main body. The diagram shows the march formation of the elements within the FSE.

# MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION ADVANCED GUARD (MAIN BODY)




Figure 2.2.2.2-10.

The advance guard main body has the mission of either eliminating enemy opposition, permitting continuation of the march, or fixing the enemy force to permit a flank attack by the main force. Artillery and tanks are habitually placed forward in the column. The diagram shows the march formation of the elements within the advance guard main body.

# MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION ADVANCED GUARD (MAIN BODY)




Figure 2.2.2.2-14.

The main force of the MRR is the remainder (about two thirds) of the regiment. The diagram shows the march formation of the elements within the main force of the MRR.

Initial Stimulus Presentation




Figure 2.2.2.2-2.

This picture shows a CRP of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the CRP?

- a. nothing
- b. three motorized rifle squads
- c. artillery battery
- d. air defense battery
- e. tank platoon

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]



Outcome

[The trainee must select option "b" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2-3.

This picture shows a CRP of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the CRP?

- a. nothing
- b. three motorized rifle squads
- c. NBC reconnaissance team
- d. artillery battery
- e. tank platoon

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select option "c" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2.2-4.

This picture shows a CRP of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the CRP?

- a. nothing
- b. three motorized rifle squads
- c. artillery battery
- d. engineer reconnaissance squad
- e. tank platoon

### Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select option "d" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2.2-5.

This picture shows a CRP of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the CRP?

- a. nothing
- b. NBC reconnaissance team
- c. engineer reconnaissance squad
- d. tank platoon
- e. both b and c

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select option "e" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2-1.

This picture shows a CRP of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the CRP?

- a. nothing
- b. NBC reconnaissance team
- c. engineer reconnaissance squad
- d. tank platoon
- e. both b and c

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select option "a" for a correct answer.]

### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11.

Please note once again the position of the CRP within the advance guard and with respect to the main force. The next group of questions relates to the the Forward Security Element (FSE). Please note its position within the advance guard and with respect to the main force

# MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT




Figure 2.2.2.2-6.

The FSE is normally a motorized rifle company reinforced with tanks, artillery, mortars, engineers, and chemical defense.

MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION  
FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT




Figure 2.2.2.2-7.

The is the FSE of a motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing?

- a. none
- b. an engineer platoon
- c. a chemical defense platoon
- d. a mortar battery and an artillery battery
- e. a motorized rifle company with a tank platoon

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select option "b" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2-8.

The is the FSE of a motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing?

- a. none
- b. an engineer platoon
- c. a chemical defense platoon
- d. a mortar battery and an artillery battery
- e. a motorized rifle company with a tank platoon

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]



### Outcome

[The trainee must select option "d" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2.2-9.

The is the FSE of a motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing?

- a. none
- b. an engineer platoon
- c. a chemical defense platoon
- d. a mortar battery and an artillery battery
- e. a motorized rifle company with a tank platoon

### Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select option "c" for a correct answer.]

#### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT




Figure 2.2.2.2-6.

You have just learned the composition of the FSE which is depicted in Figure 2.2.2.2-6. The FSE is normally a motorized rifle company reinforced with tanks, artillery, mortars, engineer and chemical defense.

## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11.

Please note once again the position of the FSE within the advance guard and with respect to the main force. The next group of questions relates to the the main body of the advance guard. Please note its position with respect to the remainder of the advance guard and the main force.

# MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION ADVANCED GUARD (MAIN BODY)




Figure 2.2.2.2-10.

The main body of the advance guard constitutes the bulk of the combat power of the advance guard. It consists of a motorized rifle battalion (minus one MR company in the FSE augmented by anti-tank, anti-aircraft, artillery, and tanks.

MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION  
ADVANCED GUARD (MAIN BODY)




Figure 2.2.2.2-11.

This picture shows the main body of the advance guard of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the advance guard main body?

- a. nothing
- b. tank regiment
- c. an anti-tank platoon, an anti-air section, and an artillery battalion
- d. tank company
- e. two motorized rifle companies

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select option "c" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2.2-12.

This picture shows the main body of the advance guard of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the advance guard main body?

- a. nothing
- b. tank regiment
- c. an anti-tank platoon, an anti-air section, and an artillery battalion
- d. tank company
- e. two motorized rifle companies

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select option "e" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2.2-13.

This picture shows the main body of the advance guard of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the advance guard main body?

- a. nothing
- b. tank regiment
- c. an anti-tank platoon, an anti-air section, and an artillery battalion
- d. tank company
- e. two motorized rifle companies

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select option "d" for a correct answer.]

#### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION ADVANCED GUARD (MAIN BODY)




Figure 2.2.2.2-10.

You have just learned the composition of the advance guard main body which is depicted in Figure 2.2.2.2-10. The main body of the advance guard constitutes the bulk of the combat power of the advance guard. It consists of a motorized rifle battalion (minus one MR company in the FSE) augmented by anti-tank, anti-aircraft, artillery, and tanks.



## MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11.

Please note once again the position of the main body of the advance guard with respect to the remainder of the advance guard and the main force. The next group of questions relates to the the main force of the motorized rifle regiment. Please note its position with respect to the remainder of the motorized rifle regiment.

# MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION ADVANCED GUARD (MAIN BODY)




Figure 2.2.2.2-14.

The main force of the Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) march formation constitutes about 2/3 of the combat power of the MRR. It consists of an MRR (minus one MR battalion in the advance guard) augmented by anti-tank, anti-aircraft, missiles, artillery, and tanks.

# MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION MAIN FORCE




Figure 2.2.2.2-15.

This picture shows the main force of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the main force of the regiment?

- nothing
- tank division
- an anti-tank battery and an artillery battalion
- an anti-aircraft section and a SAM platoon
- two motorized rifle battalions augmented with tank companies

## Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select option "c" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2.2-16.

This picture shows the main force of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the main force of the regiment?

- a. nothing
- b. tank division
- c. an anti-tank battery and an artillery battalion
- d. an anti-aircraft section and a SAM platoon
- e. two motorized rifle battalions augmented with tank companies

### Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select option "e" for a correct answer.]

#### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION MAIN FORCE




Figure 2.2.2.2-17.

This picture shows the main force of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment march formation. What components are missing from the main force of the regiment?

- a. nothing
- b. tank division
- c. an anti-tank battery and an artillery battalion
- d. an anti-aircraft section and a SAM platoon
- e. two motorized rifle battalions augmented with tank companies

### Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select option "d" for a correct answer.]

#### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION ADVANCED GUARD (MAIN BODY)




Figure 2.2.2.2-14.

You have just learned the composition of the main force of the Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) in march formation which is depicted in Figure 2.2.2.2-14. The MRR march formation constitutes about 2/3 of the combat power of the MRR. It consists of an MRR (minus one MRR battalion in the advance guard) augmented by anti-tank, anti-aircraft, missiles, artillery, and tanks.




Figure 2.2.2.2-18.

Which portion of the MRR march formation is depicted in Figure 2.2.2.2-18?

- main force
- combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP)
- forward security element (FSE)
- advance guard main body

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," or "d."]

Outcome

[The trainee must select option "d" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2.2-19.

Which portion of the MRR march formation is depicted in Figure 2.2.2.2-19?

- a. main force
- b. combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP)
- c. forward security element (FSE)
- d. advance guard main body

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," or "d."]



Outcome

[The trainee must select option "a" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2.2-20.

Which portion of the MRR march formation is depicted in Figure 2.2.2.2-20?

- a. main force
- b. combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP)
- c. forward security element (FSE)
- d. advance guard main body

Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," or "d."]

### Outcome

[The trainee must select option "b" for a correct answer.]




Figure 2.2.2.2-21.

Which portion of the MRR march formation is depicted in Figure 2.2.2.2-21?

- a. main force
- b. combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP)
- c. forward security element (FSE)
- d. advance guard main body

### Response

[The trainee selects "a," "b," "c," or "d."]

## Outcome

[The trainee must select option "c" for a correct answer.]

## Review

You have just learned the composition of each part of a motorized rifle regiment in Soviet march formation when anticipating a meeting engagement. You identified missing portions of the CRP, FSE, the main body of the advance guard, and the main force. You also identified these groups by their components.

### MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION




Figure 2.2.2.1-11.

The advance guard of a Soviet MRR usually consists of a motorized rifle battalion reinforced with artillery, tanks, air defense, engineer, and chemical elements. The advance guard dispatches a forward security element (FSE), which in its turn dispatches a combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP). The FSE is an augmented company, and the CRP is an augmented platoon.

# MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE PATROL




Figure 2.2.2.2-1.

The CRP is a fighting patrol consisting of a motorized rifle platoon augmented with chemical/radiation and engineer reconnaissance personnel. The mission of the patrol is to provide prompt information on the enemy's strength, composition, and direction of movement. The patrol attempts to penetrate and report on the enemy main body. The patrol also reports information on routes, the radiological and chemical situation, and the nature of the terrain. The diagram shows the march formation of the elements within the CRP.




Figure 2.2.2.2-10.

The advance guard main body has the mission of either eliminating enemy opposition, permitting continuation of the march, or fixing the enemy force to permit a flank attack by the main force. Artillery and tanks are habitually placed forward in the column. The diagram shows the march formation of the elements within the advance guard main body.

# **MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT MARCH FORMATION ADVANCED GUARD (MAIN BODY)**




Figure 2.2.2.2-14.

The main force of the MRR is the remainder of the regiment. The diagram shows the march formation of the elements within the main force of the MRR.

## Appendix B

### ADVANCED BATTLEMASTER

#### 1. ADVANCED BATTLEMASTER OVERVIEW

The advanced BattleMaster approach to training is based on a "fit" between pattern recognition theory and the procedure which is most frequently followed by a tactical commander in assessing the Threat facing him and deriving a tactical plan to defeat that Threat. These steps are (1) receipt and understanding of verbal and visual inputs from higher, lower, and adjacent sources; (2) synthesis of this information and the development of a representation ("mental model") of the battlefield; and (3) development of a plan of action which will defeat the Threat as perceived in the "mental model". Recurring activities throughout this process are cross-checking of the "mental model" with other, primarily staff, derived patterns and "war gaming" to consider the impact of changes to the situation, e.g., the projecting of the "mental model" to situations which anticipate Threat activity. Based on this analytical process, the commander then formulates a plan of action to defeat the Threat which he is facing. Next, he tests this plan against the plan of action(s) derived by his staff and conducts a cross check to see if he or they have left any key elements out. Depending on the strength of the two (or more) plans he will select one for execution, normally providing guidance which incorporates the strength of the non-selected plan(s) into the selected plan. The quality of interpretation of the patterns and, consequently, the quality of his derived plan of action, can be improved by his exposure to and comparison with the patterns and actions developed by expert or experienced commanders and by understanding the logic which influenced the development of the experts' patterns and action plans.

#### 2. ADVANCED BATTLEMASTER TRAINING PLAN

The Advanced BattleMaster Training Plan will attempt to replicate the process described above through the use of a series of structured experiences that, while varied in presentation sequence, will replicate the general presentation sequence which occurs within an operational unit. These steps include verbal reporting; visual sightings; "mental model" development; cross checking against plotted visual patterns; interpretation of the pattern; cross-checking of the pattern against pattern(s) derived by expert commanders; formulation of a plan of action; and cross-checking against an expert-derived plan of action. Important aspects of this training program include assisting the commander identify missing elements of the pattern which may limit use of the pattern in plan formulation, and assisting the commander to derive Essential Elements of Information (EEI) which will help to develop the pattern either prior to its initiation or during the battle.

### 3. EXAMPLE TRAINING PLAN

#### **3.1. Information Inputs**

The inputs to the commander and his staff may be verbal or non-verbal and direct or indirect. That is, in the course of a battle, the commander is exposed to a number of stimuli which tend to influence his perception of the battle and thereby influence the plan of action selected or developed. Typical stimuli which are a part of virtually any battle environment are monitored radio traffic; direct communications contact; situation reports rendered to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC); intelligence spot reports rendered to the TOC; personal observation by the commander; personal discussions with subordinates; and observation of maps posted by the battalion tactical operations center (TOC). The following includes typical information traffic:

"BTR sighted vicinity ....."

"152mm fire received from vicinity....."

" 2 main battle tanks sighted....."

" Dismounted soldiers observed vicinity....."

" Dust column spotted behind.....ridge"

" Smoke generated from ..... to ....."

" 4 tanks sighted vicinity..... Engaged. Target effects unclear."

" 122mm fire received vicinity..... One Bradley disabled. One EM KIA; 1 officer WIA"

" Helicopters observed moving NW vicinity..... Appear to be mix of attack and transporters"

" 1st platoon, A Co heavily engaged against tanks vicinity....."

" Sapper vehicle and dismounted sappers working vicinity..... Engaged with mortars. They withdrew."

The commander personally observes the following Threat vehicles vicinity.....



**T-80**



**BMP 2 (M-1981)**



The brigade commander reports that he has seen what appears to be a command vehicle vicinity .....

In talking with the B Company commander, he reports to the battalion commander that some of his soldiers heard track noise to his front.

### **3.2. Evolved Patterns ("mental models")**

From the reports above and using a background of extensive readings, study in formal military courses and experience in previous command and staff positions, the commander formulates a pattern or "mental model" of the situation with which he is faced. This pattern lays out an interpretation of the battlefield based on a combination of known and indicated activity in light of Threat doctrine. This process helps to solidify the commander's perception of the Threat and the plan of action to counter the Threat. It is here that the commander-designate can learn by using the BattleMaster approach to training. The commander-in-training is provided an electronic tool box of Threat mini-models and is required to array them on the battlefield based on the reported activities. From this he is required to develop a pattern which depicts the Threat array based upon available and interpreted information. He must also identify key elements of information which are missing (EEI) and assign an estimate of the confidence with which he can make tactical plans based on the pattern he has derived. Following development of his mental model, he is then provided a expert's mental model (pattern) of the battlefield, a listing of the expert's perception of missing items of essential information (EEI) and the degree of confidence with which the expert makes tactical decisions given the information available. In all cases, explanatory notes and illustrations accompany the expert's reasoning so that the novice can "learn" from the discussion provided by the expert.

### **3.3. Cross Check with S3 Tactical Plot**

After the commander has independently arrived at a "mental model", he will then seek confirmation or denial of its validity, normally through checking against the plot of actual and interpreted activity as posted on the battalion operations map. Through this medium, the commander can check the accuracy of his perceptions, while concurrently double checking the logic and accuracy of his staff. This process is normally conducted in the form of a "stand up" at the situation map with the commander conducting a question and answer session with his staff--particularly the S2 and S3. The quality of questions which are asked during this session and the answers given are key to the orientation of the commander and staff along a common ground of reasoning so that the commander can leave the TOC and control the battle from a forward position with the assurance that he and his staff have a common understanding of the battle situation (at least until the next piece of critical information comes in). This "stand up" session will also include "war gaming" of steps likely to be taken by the Threat forces. Provided an S3 plot of the battlefield, the TCDC student will formulate or select the questions which are critical to creating a common understanding between the staff and commander. This will then be compared to the expert commander who observes the tactical operations plot and

conducts such a session. The logic for the development of questions by the expert commander and parameters for expected answers will be set forth so that the novice commander can understand the answers the expert is searching for to develop his "mental model" in conjunction with his staff.

### **3.4. Tactical Plan Evolution**

After evolution of a "mental model" in which he has a degree of confidence and understands what the "missing pieces" are, the commander then develops a course of action to successfully meet the enemy threat. This is developed in the form of tactical graphics or patterns and normally involves "war gaming" in which the commander develops alternate graphics or patterns to counter possible changes in the Threat tactical operations. The TCDC student will develop such a plan using an electronic tool box.

### **3.5. Cross Check With Expert Commander**

As with other steps in the training program, the commander-designate then compares his graphic representation and the logic used in developing his course of action and "war gaming" with that developed and conducted by an expert commander.

### **3.6. Summary**

The process described above incorporates the principles of pattern recognition and replicates many of the realities of problem identification and definition using verbal and visual patterns as practiced in Army units operating in a tactical environment. By participating in a structured learning experience which provides flexibility in pattern development and feedback using expert input, the commander-designate is required to develop visualization of the battlefield and to synthesize the meaning of this visualization. He then is able to receive immediate feedback on his visualization and synthesis in comparison to expert level commanders' visualization and synthesis.

### **3.7 Example Lesson**

The attached sample lesson material provides a flavor for the type of training which may be provided using the BattleMaster approach to training. Though presented as a "paper model", this approach to training is readily adaptable to computer presentation and, in fact, can be enhanced by the use of computer capabilities such as a "tool box" of Threat equipment icons and symbology. Since it is focused on the material available from Lesson 7, TCDC, it does not include the development of patterns related to Friendly courses of action as described in paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5 above.

# **PATTERN RECOGNITION TRAINING**

## **Advance Sheet**

### **Lesson PR-1**

**INTRODUCTION.** The objective of the lesson you are about to undertake is to make you a better qualified tactical commander by assisting you in recognizing pattern of Threat activity with which you are likely to be faced in combat or training. The instructional approach which is taken relies on the fact that experienced commanders are able to take seemingly unrelated information and form it into patterns or "mental models" on which they then make decisions and take action. This lesson, which focuses on the building of "mental models" related to the Threat, is intended as but one of several pattern-recognition based lessons which would prepare you and your staff in the development of "mental models" prior to the employment of your battalion in training exercises or combat.

### **SCOPE**

This 1-hour block of instruction is a pattern-recognition based lesson designed to assist the student in recognizing Threat of equipment, patterns of equipment, patterns of Threat formations, and patterns of Threat maneuver. You will serve as the battalion commander of a mech infantry battalion, and through the evaluation of reported actions and activities, form "mental models" of the Threat facing you on which you can develop your battle plan.

### **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

**B.01 TASK:** Visualize Threat equipment based on reported sightings.

**CONDITION:** Given reported Threat equipment sightings and icons representing Threat military equipment.

**STANDARD:** Identify, with 100% accuracy, the icons which represent the reported sightings of Threat equipment.

**B.02 TASK:** Understand the significance of the appearance of selected types of Threat equipment at various locations on the battlefield.

**CONDITION:** Given reported Threat equipment sightings and icons representing Threat military equipment.

**STANDARD:** Explain the significance of selected types of equipment at various locations on the battlefield. Explanation must include the caveats and limitations associated with identifying specific units or formations based on the presence of multi-use vehicles.

**B.03 TASK:** Visualize Threat formations from Threat equipment sightings. Explain the logic for your choice.

**CONDITION:** Given reported Threat equipment sightings including identification of equipment, location, and activity.

**STANDARD:** Select, with 100% accuracy, the most likely Threat formation represented by the Threat equipment array. Be able to defend and explain the logic of your selection.

**B.04 TASK:** Visualize most likely Threat battle plans based on available intelligence information. Explain the logic of your choice.


**CONDITION:** Given reported sightings of Threat activities including identification of location and activity.

**STANDARD:** Select, with 100% accuracy, the most likely Threat battle plan. Be able to defend and explain the logic of your selection.

## FRAME 1

### THE SITUATION:

You are commander of a Mech Infantry Heavy Task Force (3 Mech, 1 Armor Teams). Your mission is to defend in sector as part of a brigade defense in sector. You are the center battalion in the brigade sector with sister battalions on your north and south flanks. The terrain over which you will fight is high desert valley floor with numerous ground folds, low hills, and generally sloping terrain which bottoms in sector in a dry stream bed (WADI MERZA) which runs cross-sector in your battalion area. The terrain is generally trafficable to tracked vehicles but limited to wheel vehicles except along the crude trails or tracks (TRIGH). The Threat facing the Brigade consists of a Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) reinforced with Army assets. You are expecting to have to fight one of the Motorized Rifle Regiments (MRR) of the MRD. It is essential that the MRD's main attack be identified at the earliest possible moment so that the brigade commander can launch a timely counterattack. A sketch map of your sector is illustrated on the next frame.




FRAME 3

SITUATION CONTINUED: THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES OR REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN YOUR TOC OR HEARD OVER THE RADIO DURING THE PAST 30 MINUTES.


- A. "One BMP sighted vicinity KOPI KARIM"
- B. "BRDM-2 sighted along TRIGH MATRA South of KOPI KARIM"
- C. "A BTR-70 is 300 meters east of KOPI KARIM along the trigh"
- D. "There is some kind of tracked vehicle in the saddle of KOPI KARIM with a squad of soldiers dismounting "
- E. "There's a BMP with soldiers dismounted 500 meters south of KARIM"

QUESTION: BASED ON THESE MESSAGES, WHICH PATTERN BELOW DO YOU EXPECT TO VIEW ON YOUR S2/S3 SITUATION MAP?


ANSWER: \_\_\_\_



A



B



C

#### FRAME 4

Correct Answer is:

"C"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "C". The reported Threat activity is best and most accurately shown in Pattern C. Pattern B reflects erroneous posting of the reported activities and establishes a "mental model" that is inaccurate and therefore misleading. Pattern A reflects an incomplete pattern development based on reported sightings and is therefore also inaccurate and misleading". If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "C". This answer is correct because it shows a true and accurate posting of the reported Threat activity. This, in turn, provides the basis for the development of an accurate pattern into which future information will be integrated and on which to base future actions and activities"]




FRAME 5

QUESTION: BASED ON THE REPORTED THREAT ACTIVITY AND YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT, IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE ICONS BELOW WHICH ARE ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SIGHTING.

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_\_

Sighting A: "One BMP sighted vicinity KOPI KARIM"



FRAME 6

Correct Answer is:

"8"


[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "8". Item #8 (BMP) is the primary fighting vehicle of the Threat MRR. It is weapons system around which the motorized rifle squad, platoon, company, and battalion is built. It is recognizable by its track system and its dual, 73-mm smoothbore gun and coax machine gun, weapons systems. The weapons system you selected was the \_\_\_\_\_. (description of the system selected appears here)". If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "8". Item #8 (BMP) is the primary fighting vehicle of the Threat MRR. It is weapons system around which the motorized rifle squad, platoon, company, and battalion is built. It is recognizable by its track system and its dual, 73-mm smoothbore gun and coax machine gun, weapons systems."]

FRAME 7

QUESTION: BASED ON THE REPORTED THREAT ACTIVITY AND YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT, IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE ICONS BELOW WHICH ARE ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SIGHTING.

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_\_

Sighting B: "BRDM-2 sighted along TRIGH MATRA south of KOPI KARIM"



FRAME 8

Correct Answer is:

"5"


[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "5". Item #5 (BRDM-2) is a multi-use vehicle and found in several units within a Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) and the Motorized Rifle Division (MRD). One of its frequent uses is as an NBC reconnaissance vehicle. The weapons system you selected was the \_\_\_\_\_. (description of the system selected appears here)". If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "5". Item #5 (BRDM-2) is a multi-use vehicle and found in several units within a Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) and the Motorized Rifle Division (MRD). One of its frequent uses is as an NBC reconnaissance vehicle."]

FRAME 9

QUESTION: BASED ON THE REPORTED THREAT ACTIVITY AND YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT, IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE ICONS BELOW WHICH ARE ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SIGHTING.

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_\_

Sighting C: "A BTR-70 is 300 meters east of KOPI KARIM along the trigh."



FRAME 10

Correct Answer is:

"2"


[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "2". Item #2 (BTR 70) is an eight wheeled vehicle which is often used as a reconnaissance or command and control vehicle in several different type of units. It is used as a reconnaissance vehicle for engineer units in the MRR and MRD. Earlier versions, e.g., BTR 60 may be in use in some units. The weapons system you selected was the \_\_\_\_\_. (description of the system selected appears here)." If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "2". Item #2 (BTR 70) is an eight wheeled vehicle which is often used as a reconnaissance or command and control vehicle in several different type of units. It is used as a reconnaissance vehicle for engineer units in the MRR and MRD. Earlier versions, e.g., BTR 60 may be in use in some units."]

FRAME 11

QUESTION: BASED ON THE REPORTED THREAT ACTIVITY AND YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT, IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE ICONS BELOW WHICH ARE ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SIGHTING.

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_\_

Sighting D: "There is some kind of tracked vehicle in the saddle of KOPI KARIM with a squad of soldiers dismounting "



FRAME 12

Correct Answer is:

"8"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "8". Based on the report that the vehicle is tracked and that a squad of troops is debarking from it leads to the logical conclusion that the vehicle is a BMP. The BTR-70 is also capable of carrying a squad of soldiers but is an eight-wheeled vehicle. The weapons system you selected was the \_\_\_\_\_. (description of the system selected appears here)." If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "8". Item #8 (BMP) is the primary fighting vehicle of the Threat MRR. It is weapons system around which the motorized rifle squad, platoon, company, and battalion is built. It is reasonable to assume that the identification of a tracked vehicle debarking a squad of troops is a BMP since that is the only tracked carrier in the MRR capable of carrying a squad of troops. The BTR-70 can also carry a squad of troops but since it is an eight wheeled vehicle, it is clearly not the vehicle being reported"]




FRAME 13

QUESTION: BASED ON THE REPORTED THREAT ACTIVITY AND YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT, IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE ICONS BELOW WHICH ARE ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SIGHTING.

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_\_

Sighting E. "There's a BMP with soldiers dismounted 500 meters south of KARIM"



FRAME 14

Correct Answer is:

"8"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "8". Item #8 (BMP) is the primary fighting vehicle of the Threat MRR. It is weapons system around which the motorized rifle squad, platoon, company, and battalion is built. It is recognizable by its track system and its dual, 73-mm smoothbore gun and coax machine gun, weapons systems. The weapons system you selected was the \_\_\_\_\_. (description of the system selected appears here)". If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "8". Item #8 (BMP) is the primary fighting vehicle of the Threat MRR. It is weapons system around which the motorized rifle squad, platoon, company, and battalion is built. It is recognizable by its track system and its dual, 73-mm smoothbore gun and coax machine gun, weapons systems."]

## FRAME 15


### REVIEW:

The recognition of Threat equipment and an understanding of that equipment relative to normal Threat formations is important to "seeing" the battlefield. The previous five frames have been intended to assist you to gain a visualization of types of Threat vehicles and to understand the meaning of "cues" based on typical reporting. The review below helps to summarize the types of equipment with which you are likely to be faced and the significance of its presence on the battlefield.

Item #1 The 120 mm mortar is organic to the mortar battery of the MRR. Some units have the baseplate mounted 120mm which is carried on trucks. Other units may have a new version of a self-propelled mortar carrier. The truck-mounted mortar carrier is illustrated below:




Item #2 (BTR 70) is an eight wheeled vehicle which is often used as a reconnaissance or command and control vehicle in several different type of units. Earlier versions, e.g., BTR 60 may be in use in some units. It is often used as an engineer reconnaissance vehicle in engineer units. This vehicle is illustrated below:



**BTR- 70**

Item #3 (2S3) is a self-propelled, 152mm howitzer. It is normally found at the division field artillery regiment and higher. It is often employed forward in the Regimental Artillery Group. This vehicle is illustrated below:



**152MM(SP)**

Item #4 (ZSU 23-4) is a self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery weapon system. It is found in MRRs and Tank Regiments (TRs). This vehicle is illustrated below:



**ZSU-23-4**

Item #5 (BRDM-2) is a multi-use vehicle and found in several units within an MRD. One of its frequent uses is as an NBC reconnaissance vehicle. This vehicle is illustrated below:



**BRDM-2 RKH**

Item #6 (T-80) is the Threat main battle tank. It, or older versions (T-72, T-64), is found in Threat Tank Divisions (TDs), TRs, and Tank Battalions (TBs) organic to MRRs. This vehicle is illustrated below:



**T-80**

Item #7 (BMD) is an airborne armor fighting vehicle, employed by airborne forces in airdropped or airdropped roles. It is not normally associated with heavy forces such as the MRR or TR. This vehicle is illustrated below:



**BMD 1**

Item #8 (BMP) is the primary fighting vehicle of the Threat MRR. It is weapons system around which the motorized rifle squad, platoon, company, and battalion is built. This vehicle is illustrated below:




**BMP 2 (M-1981)**

FRAME 16

SITUATION CONTINUED: YOU REVIEW THE MESSAGES WHICH HAVE BEEN RECEIVED THUS FAR:

- A. "One BMP sighted vicinity KOPI KARIM"
- B. "BRDM-2 sighted along TRIGH MATRA South of KOPI KARIM"
- C. "A BTR-70 is 300 meters east of KOPI KARIM along the trigh"
- D. "There is some kind of tracked vehicle in the saddle of KOPI KARIM with a squad of soldiers dismounting "
- E. "There's a BMP with soldiers dismounted 500 meters south of KARIM"

SITUATION CONTINUED: YOU ALSO REVIEW THE PATTERN OF EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED BY YOUR SCOUTS AND WHICH YOU AND YOUR STAFF HAVE ANALYZED.



QUESTION: BASED ON THE MESSAGES RECEIVED THUS FAR AND YOUR VISUALIZATION OF EQUIPMENT ON THE BATTLEFIELD, WHAT CONCLUSIONS OR INFERENCES CAN YOU DRAW REGARDING THE THREAT?

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_\_

- A. No conclusions can be reached. The information available is too incomplete.
- B. The MRD has selected your sector for its main attack.
- C. The MRR has selected its avenue of attack along TRIGH MATRA.
- D. You are seeing elements of the MRR Forward Security Element (FSE).
- E. None of the above.

FRAME 17

Correct Answer is:

"E"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "E". The Combat Reconnaissance Patrol consists of a motorized rifle platoon, an NBC recon team, and an engineer recon squad. The equipment reports you have received are indicative of an element that possesses this mix of capabilities. Remember that a regiment may establish several combat reconnaissance patrols. Thus, the appearance of one patrol does not necessarily indicate a commitment along a specific avenue. This is particularly true in the terrain you are operating on since there is clearly a favorable avenue in the southern part of the sector. The appearance of a CRP in the north and none in the south may simply be a lack of coordinated timing in the Threat reconnaissance plan across the sector. The answer you selected was \_\_\_\_\_. (logic associated with the selected answer appears here). If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "E". This answer is correct because the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol consists of a motorized rifle platoon, an NBC recon team, and an engineer recon squad. The equipment reports you have received are indicative of an element that possesses this mix of capabilities. Remember that a regiment may establish several combat reconnaissance patrols. Thus, the appearance of one patrol does not necessarily indicate a commitment along a specific avenue. This is particularly true in the terrain you are operating on since there is clearly a favorable avenue in the southern part of the sector. The appearance of a CRP in the north and none in the south may simply be a lack of coordinated timing in the Threat reconnaissance plan across the sector."]

## FRAME 18

### REVIEW:

Given the reported sightings and the evolving Threat equipment pattern:

If you selected "A" and believe that no conclusions can be reached because the information available is too incomplete, you need to check your understanding of Threat doctrine as it relates to approach to contact formations. The pattern being displayed (as reported) is an indicator that he is on the move in the northern sector and has mounted a Combat Reconnaissance Patrol along the TRIGH MATRA.

If you selected "B" and believe that the Threat Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) commander has selected your sector for its main attack, you may want to restudy indicators of a division main attack. Based on the information provided, you really can't make this deduction yet. There are primary indicators missing, such as commitment of his reconnaissance battalion and the disposition of his artillery. He, like us, tends to weight his main attack and those indicators simply haven't shown up in the reports available to you at this time.

If you selected "C" and believe that the Threat Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) commander has selected your sector for its main attack, you may want to restudy indicators of a regimental main attack. Even though the Threat has clearly indicated an interest in the TRIGH MATRA approach, there is no indication at this time that he has selected this approach as his major avenue of approach. Some of the major indicators which you may look for include:

Presence of the Forward Security Element. If this follows the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP), it is an indicator of commitment of an approach to combat along a particular route.

Weighting of the attack. To this point there is no indication that the regimental commander has weighted his forces along the TRIGH MATRA. It is entirely likely that you might expect to see a Combat Reconnaissance Patrol soon appear along TRIGH EIFFEL.

If you selected "C" and believe that the equipment pattern which you are observing is that which represents the Forward Security Element (FSE) of an MRR, you need to check yourself out on this point. There is no equipment reported thus far that indicates the forward security element has arrived on the battlefield that you can observe. This, of course, doesn't mean that it isn't out there, but your scouts haven't picked it up if it's there. This is an excellent time to push the S2 to emphasize locating of equipment which are indicators of the forward security element (FSE).

If you selected "E" you probably remember that the normal composition of the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol consists of a motorized rifle platoon, an NBC recon team, and an engineer recon squad. The equipment reports you have




received are indicative of an element that possesses this mix of capabilities. Remember that a regiment may establish several combat reconnaissance patrols. Thus, the appearance of one patrol does not necessarily indicate a commitment along a specific avenue. This is particularly true in the terrain you are operating on since there is clearly a favorable avenue in the southern part of the sector. The appearance of a CRP in the north and none in the south may simply be a lack of coordinated timing in the Threat reconnaissance plan across the sector.

FRAME 19

QUESTION: BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO YOU, WHICH THREAT MANEUVER (REPRESENTED BY THE PATTERNS ILLUSTRATED BELOW) MIGHT YOU EXPECT TO SEE NEXT?

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_



FRAME 20

Correct Answer is:

"C"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "C". This pattern was selected because it is reflective of what you might "expect to see next" after you have identified what appears to be the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol. That is, the units identified on the S2 map--FA battery, Mortar battery, and an engineer platoon-- are normally found in the MRR Forward Security Element which one might "expect to see next" after the CRP. The answer you selected was \_\_\_\_\_. (logic associated with the selected answer appears here). If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "C". This pattern was selected because it is reflective of what you might "expect to see next" after you have identified what appears to be the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol. That is, the units identified on the S2 map--FA battery, Mortar battery, and an engineer platoon-- are normally found in the MRR Forward Security Element which one might "expect to see next" after the CRP."]

## FRAME 21

### REVIEW:

Given the reported sightings and the evolving Threat organizational patterns:

Pattern "A" was not selected because it illustrates a considerably advanced state of the battlefield over what you might "expect to see next" based on reports currently available to you. That is, the sudden and unexplained appearance of two MRBs and an FA battalion across the front without further build up is not the normal pattern of force presentation. This is not to say it couldn't happen but if so, your scouts may well have missed some intermediate units and as a result you may be engaged by those forces much sooner than you may have anticipated.

Pattern "B" was not selected because it was not what you might "expect to see next" based on the intelligence that you are faced with an MRR. The appearance of two tank battalions following the CPR should provide you with some real heartburn since it may indicate some real problems facing you. First, your scouts may be providing some erroneous reporting. Second, your S2 may not be interpreting the reports correctly and is erroneously plotting an incorrect order of battle. Third, it may mean that the Threat division commander may have pinched out the MRR which had been headed for your sector and is attacking with his Tank Regiment in your sector. Fourth, it may mean that the Army commander has decided on a major effort in your sector and is either employing elements of the Army Independent Tank Regiment in this attack or had decided to attack with his Tank Division. In any case, the appearance of two tank battalions along an axis where you were expecting a Motorized Rifle Regiment is cause for concern, immediate reporting to higher headquarters, and further development of the situation.

Pattern "C" was selected because it is reflective of what you might "expect to see next" after you have identified what appears to be the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol. That is, the units identified on the S2 map--FA battery, Mortar battery, and an engineer platoon-- are normally found in the MRR Forward Security Element which one might "expect to see next" after the CRP.

FRAME 22

QUESTION: OF THE SOVIET EQUIPMENT ILLUSTRATED BELOW, WHICH FIVE PIECES WOULD BE INDICATORS OF THE FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT OF THE A MRR IF THEIR PRESENCE WAS REPORTED BY YOUR SCOUTS?

ANSWER: 1 \_\_\_\_\_

2 \_\_\_\_\_

3 \_\_\_\_\_

4 \_\_\_\_\_

5 \_\_\_\_\_

A



ZSU-23-2

E




ZSU-23-4

H



120mm Mortar

B




2S4

F



T-80

I



BTR-70

C



T-62

J



BMD

D



2S3

G



BMP

K



BRDM-2

## FRAME 23

Correct Answers are:

F, G, H, I, K

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answers are "F, G, H, I, K". The organizational elements in the Forward Security Element normally include a Motorized Rifle Co (less the platoon in the CRP) reinforced with a tank platoon; one or more engineer platoons (less elements in the CRP); the MRRs organic mortar battery; an artillery battery from the MRR's organic artillery battalion; and chemical defense elements (less elements in the CRP). The non-selected equipment is, by-and-large, equipment found at division or higher echelons. Although such equipment could be in the FSE, its reported presence requires confirmation since it may be an indicator of weighting of the attack by higher commanders. The answer you selected was \_\_\_\_\_. (logic associated with the selected answer appears here). If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answers which is "F, G, H, I, K". The organizational elements in the Forward Security Element normally include a Motorized Rifle Co (less the platoon in the CRP) reinforced with a tank platoon; one or more engineer platoons (less elements in the CRP); the MRRs organic mortar battery; an artillery battery from the MRR's organic artillery battalion; and chemical defense elements (less elements in the CRP). The non-selected equipment is, by-and-large, equipment found at division or higher echelons. Although such equipment could be in the FSE, its reported presence requires confirmation since it may be an indicator of weighting of the attack by higher commanders.

FRAME 24


QUESTION: WHAT PIECE OF THREAT EQUIPMENT IS MISSING FROM THE ILLUSTRATIONS BELOW WHICH, IF PRESENT, WOULD GIVE YOU GREATER CONFIDENCE THAT YOU HAD LOCATED THE FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT (FSE) OF AN MRR?

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_\_

FRAME 25

Correct Answer is:

2S1 Self-Propelled 122mm Howitzer. A profile of this system is illustrated below:



122MM(SP)

REVIEW:

The 2S1 Self-Propelled 122mm Howitzer is organic to the FA battalion organic to the MRR. Since an FA battery is normally a part of the FSE, it is reasonable to expect that the 2S1 will be a part of the equipment included in the FSE.




FRAME 26

QUESTION: IF THE EQUIPMENT PATTERN BELOW WAS REPORTED BY YOUR SCOUTS, WHICH SOVIET FORMATION WOULD YOU MOST LIKELY BE LOOKING AT?

Note: A single icon represents multiple sightings of that type equipment in relative relationship to other icons.

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_\_

1. MRR Main Force
2. MRR Main Body
3. MRR Rear Guard
4. MRR Forward Security Element
5. MRR Combat Reconnaissance Patrol
6. Unable to Match Pattern and Threat Formation



FRAME 27

Correct Answer is:

"4"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "4". This pattern typifies the Forward Security Element. It follows the CRP and precedes the Advance Guard. Some of its distinguishing features are the inclusion of tanks and the presence of mortars and field artillery in limited quantities. The answer you selected was \_\_\_\_\_. (logic associated with the selected answer appears here). If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "4". This pattern typifies the Forward Security Element. It follows the CRP and precedes the Advance Guard. Some of its distinguishing features are the inclusion of tanks and the presence of mortars and field artillery in limited quantities."]


FRAME 28

QUESTION: IF THE EQUIPMENT PATTERN BELOW WAS REPORTED BY YOUR SCOUTS, WHICH SOVIET FORMATION WOULD YOU MOST LIKELY BE LOOKING AT?

Note: A single icon represents multiple sightings of that type equipment in relative relationship to other icons.

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_

1. MRR Main Force
2. MRR Main Body
3. MRR Rear Guard
4. MRR Forward Security Element
5. MRR Combat Reconnaissance Patrol
6. Unable to Match Pattern and Threat Formation



FRAME 29

Correct Answer is:

"2"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "2". This pattern accurately represents the Main Body Advance Guard. A primary indicator of the advance guard is the presence of the ZSU-23-4. This weapons system is not normally included in the CRP or the FSE. The answer you selected was \_\_\_\_\_. (logic associated with the selected answer appears here). If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "2". This pattern accurately represents the Main Body Advance Guard. A primary indicator of the advance guard is the presence of the ZSU-23-4. This weapons system is not normally included in the CRP or the FSE."]


FRAME 30

QUESTION: IF THE EQUIPMENT PATTERN BELOW WAS REPORTED BY YOUR SCOUTS, WHICH SOVIET FORMATION WOULD YOU MOST LIKELY BE LOOKING AT?

Note: A single icon represents multiple sightings of that type equipment in relative relationship to other icons.

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_\_

1. MRR Main Force
2. MRR Main Body
3. MRR Rear Guard
4. MRR Forward Security Element
5. MRR Combat Reconnaissance Patrol
6. Unable to Match Pattern and Threat Formation



FRAME 31

Correct Answer is:

"6"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "6". The pattern represented is unusual for several reasons. First, it contains no infantry mounted in BMPs. Since the CRP and the FSE have both contained BMPs, you would expect to see BMPs in follow-on formations as well. Granted, there are reported sightings of the BTR-70 which could be an infantry carrier but it would be unusual to mix the two infantry carriers within the same MRR. This leads to the conclusion that the reported BTR-70 probably reflects the presence of engineers or other BTR-70 equipped units. Since the Soviets rely on a combined arms concept, it is unlikely that they would have a force without an infantry component. Second, the mortars are well back in the column. This is not their normal placement for mortars, which are usually well forward in the column. Third, the placement of the BRDM-2 which is indicative of an NBC monitoring team near the end of the column is unusual. The Soviets normally place their NBC monitoring and engineer reconnaissance teams well forward in the column to perform area clearance missions. Finally, the presence of the 2S3 152mm self-propelled artillery is unusual when you are searching for confirmation of an MRR. The 2S3 is organic to the MRD FA Regiment. The FA Regiment routinely pushes a portion of its assets forward into the MRR. In this instance, the lack of a mixture of 2S3s and 2S1s (organic to the MRR artillery battalion) is a matter of interest. A pattern such as this is cause for concern in that it may indicate erroneous or incomplete reporting by your scouts, erroneous interpretation by you S2, or the development of a Threat activity that bears close monitoring to identify other indicators. The answer you selected was \_\_\_\_\_. (logic associated with the selected answer appears here). If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "6". The pattern represented is unusual for several reasons. First, it contains no infantry mounted in BMPs. Since the CRP and the FSE have both contained BMPs, you would expect to see BMPs in this formation as well. Granted, there are reported sightings of the BTR-70 which could be an infantry carriers but it would be unusual to mix the two infantry carriers within the same MRR. This leads to the conclusion that the reported BTR-70 probably reflects the presence of engineers or other BTR-70 equipped units. Since the Soviets rely on a combined arms concept, it is unlikely that they would have a force without an infantry component. Second, the mortars are well back in the column. This is not their normal placement for mortars, which are normally well forward in the column. Third, the placement of the BRDM-2 which is indicative of an NBC monitoring team near the end of the column is unusual. The Soviets normally place their NBC monitoring and engineer reconnaissance teams well forward in the column to perform area clearance missions. Finally, the presence of the 2S3 152mm self-propelled artillery is unusual when you are searching for confirmation of an MRR. The 2S3 is organic to the MRD FA Regiment. The FA


Regiment routinely pushes a portion of its assets forward into the MRR. In this instance, the lack of a mixture of 2S3s and 2S1s (organic to the MRR artillery battalion) is a matter of interest. A pattern such as this is cause for concern in that it may indicate erroneous or incomplete reporting by your scouts, erroneous interpretation by you S2, or the development of a Threat activity that bears close monitoring to identify other indicators. "]

FRAME 32

REVIEW:

Given the Threat organizational patterns which are illustrated below:


Pattern A:



Pattern B:



Pattern C:



Pattern "A" typifies the Forward Security Element. It follows the CRP and precedes the Advance Guard. Some of its distinguishing features are the inclusion of tanks and the presence of mortars and field artillery in limited quantities.


Pattern "B" is a classic representation of the Main Body Advance Guard. A primary indicator of the advance guard is the presence of the ZSU-23-4. This weapons system is not normally included in the CRP or the FSE.

Pattern "C" does not represent a recognizable Threat formation that might be found in the MRR. The pattern represented is unusual for several reasons. First, it contains no infantry mounted in BMPs. Since the CRP and the FSE have both contained BMPs, you would expect to see BMPs in this formation as



well. Granted, there are reported sightings of the BTR-70 which could be an infantry carriers but it would be unusual to mix the two infantry carriers within the same MRR. This leads to the conclusion that the reported BTR-70 probably reflects the presence of engineers or other BTR-70 equipped units. Since the Soviets rely on a combined arms concept, it is unlikely that they would have a force without an infantry component. Second, the mortars are well back in the column. This is not their normal placement for mortars, which are normally well forward in the column. Third, the placement of the BRDM-2 which is indicative of an NBC monitoring team near the end of the column is unusual. The Soviets normally place their NBC monitoring and engineer reconnaissance teams well forward in the column to perform area clearance missions. Finally, the presence of the 2S3 152mm self-propelled artillery is unusual when you are searching for confirmation of an MRR. The 2S3 is organic to the MRD FA Regiment. The FA Regiment routinely pushes a portion of its assets forward into the MRR. In this instance, the lack of a mixture of 2S3s and 2S1s (organic to the MRR artillery battalion) is a matter of interest. A pattern such as this is cause for concern in that it may indicate erroneous or incomplete reporting by your scouts, erroneous interpretation by you S2, or the development of a Threat activity that bears close monitoring to identify other indicators.

The MRR Main Force is characterized by the organizational pattern illustrated below. Though it has many of the same elements as the Advance Guard, some of the equipment indicators found in the Main Force but not normally found in the Advance Guard are the Surface to Air (SAM) platoon and the presence of rear service organizations.



The MRR Rear Guard does not normally exist during an approach to combat. It is a formation which is constituted during defensive, withdrawal or delay actions.

The Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP) has already been covered in previous frames. If you selected this answer, review frames 3 and 4.

FRAME 33

SITUATION CONTINUED: THE FOLLOWING TRAFFIC HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN THE TOC DURING THE PAST HOUR.

- "152mm fires landing at base of Hill 1607 plotted from junction of TRIGH EIFFEL and TRIGH MATRA."
- "Enemy generated smoke obscuring the valley between Hill 1683 and HIT RIDGE."
- "Large dust column is rising behind HIT RIDGE. It appears to be moving southwest."
- "Four BMPs and two tanks sighted north of RUB RIDGE. Engaged them. 2 BMPs destroyed--remaining vehicle withdrew to east."
- "Dismounted engineers appear to be working vicinity minefield between HIT RIDGE and Hill 1683. Engaged with 4.2 mortars--they withdrew."
- "Third Platoon, Team Charlie engaged by tanks along southern flank."

FRAME 34

QUESTION: BASED ON THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE, WHAT REASONABLE DEDUCTIONS OR INFERENCES CAN BE MADE CONCERNING THE THREAT'S DISPOSITION FOR COMBAT?

ANSWER: \_\_\_\_

- A. Information provided is insufficient to make any significant deductions.
- B. The Threat forces are still in approach formation with his major effort concentrating along the northern corridor of your position.
- C. The Threat forces are deployed across the front of your sector and is concentrating his major effort in the southern part of your sector.
- D. The Threat forces are deployed across the front of your sector but selection of a main effort has not been indicated.
- E. None of the above.

## FRAME 35

Correct Answer is:

"D"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "D". Indications are that the Threat commander is involved in activities which lead to the conclusion that he is in other than in an approach to combat formation. The employment of combat and combat support forces on both the northern and southern approaches into your sector indicate that the Threat commander has probably moved from an approach formation to a deployed formation for combat. The activity in the southern part of your sector does not support the conclusion that the Threat major effort will be concentrated in the northern part of the sector. It appears that he may be probing in both the northern and southern sectors. There is no clear indication that he has selected the southern sector for his main attack but clearly he is active there and therefore probably interested in that approach if he can find a weakness in your position. It bears close watching for indicators of weighting of the attack in that sector. For the moment, it appears that the best answer to "wait and see" as to what is happening to your front. Having said that, however, you need to carefully consider what his next move might be and have a firm gameplan for collecting information that would indicate his next moves. An understanding of his preferences for attack and the indicators of the forms of attack are essential. The answer you selected was \_\_\_\_\_. (logic associated with the selected answer appears here). If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "D". Indications are that the Threat commander is involved in activities which lead to the conclusion that he is in other than in an approach to combat formation. The employment of combat and combat support forces on both the northern and southern approaches into your sector indicate that the Threat commander has probably moved from an approach formation to a deployed formation for combat. The activity in the southern part of your sector does not support the conclusion that the Threat major effort will be concentrated in the northern part of the sector. It appears that he may be probing in both the northern and southern sectors. There is no clear indication that he has selected the southern sector for his main attack but clearly he is active there and therefore probably interested in that approach if he can find a weakness in your position. It bears close watching for indicators of weighting of the attack in that sector. For the moment, it appears that the best answer to "wait and see" as to what is happening to your front. Having said that, however, you need to carefully consider what his next move might be and have a firm gameplan for collecting information that would indicate his next moves. An understanding of his preferences for attack and the indicators of the forms of attack are essential."]

## FRAME 36

### REVIEW:

The identification of the Threat commander's intent is often not clear. In the circumstances discussed in this situation there were several indications that the Threat forces are in other than in an approach to combat formation (sightings across the front, equipment in quantities and at locations on the battlefield that indicate a dispersion of forces, and local attacks in strengths that indicate a dispersion of forces).

The employment of combat and combat support forces on both the northern and southern approaches into your sector indicate that the Threat commander has probably moved from an approach formation to a deployed formation for combat.


Activity in the southern part of your sector does not, in and of itself, support the conclusion that the Threat major effort will be concentrated in the northern part of the sector. Since he is probing in both the northern and southern sectors there is no clear indication that he has selected either sector for his main attack. Clearly he is active in the southern sector and therefore probably interested in that approach if he can find a weakness in your position. Of course, his activity in the south may be a ruse to prepare for a determined attack in the north. Activity in both sectors bears close watching for indicators of weighting of the attack in either sector.

For the moment, it appears that the best answer to "wait and see" as to what is happening to your front. Having said that, however, you need to carefully consider what his next move might be and have a firm gameplan for collecting information that would indicate his next moves. An understanding of his preferences for attack and the indicators of the forms of attack are essential.


FRAME 37

QUESTION: GIVEN THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AND YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET DOCTRINE, WHICH PATTERN RELATED TO SOVIET ARTILLERY AND ILLUSTRATED BELOW WOULD YOU EXPECT TO SEE ON THE BN S2/S3 SITUATION MAP?


ANSWER: \_\_\_\_



A



B



C

FRAME 38

Correct Answer is:

"A"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "A". Based on your evaluation that the Threat commander has deployed his force across the battlefield for attack, the relationship of the field artillery Regimental Artillery Groups (RAG) to the MRR forward forces and the Divisional Artillery Group (DAG) to the RAG is depicted in about the right relationship. The presence of Hill 1683 in center of sector may force some repositioning of the RAG in order to cover both the northern and southern sectors of his attack if attacks along both approaches simultaneously. The answer you selected was \_\_\_\_\_. (logic associated with the selected answer appears here). If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "A". Based on your evaluation that the Threat commander has deployed his force across the battlefield for attack, the relationship of the field artillery Regimental Artillery Groups (RAG) to the MRR forward forces and the Divisional Artillery Group (DAG) to the RAG is depicted in about the right relationship. The presence of Hill 1683 in center of sector may force some repositioning of the RAG in order to cover both the northern and southern sectors of his attack if attacks along both approaches simultaneously."]

## FRAME 39

### REVIEW:

The doctrinal/situational laydown of Threat forces is a knowledge which you as the commander must possess in order to train, check, and challenge your staff. In this case you have viewed the S2/S3 situation map and challenged their dispositions of Threat artillery based on a "mental model" of the Threat artillery laydown.

Pattern "A" indicates that the Threat commander has deployed his force across the battlefield for attack, and that the relationship of the field artillery Regimental Artillery Groups (RAG) to the MRR forward forces and the Divisional Artillery Group (DAG) to the RAG is depicted in about the right relationship. The presence of Hill 1683 in center of sector may force some repositioning of the RAG in order to cover both the northern and southern sectors of his attack if attacks along both approaches simultaneously.

Pattern "B" indicates that the MRR commander is weighting his attack in the southern sector. The positioning of the RAG in the southern sector backed by the DAG positioning in your sector may also indicate that the MRD commander has decided to launch his division main attack in your sector. These artillery dispositions, if confirmed, are cause for concern and further information collection develop other indicators of tactical activities and intentions. You need to challenge your S2 to defend this position. He may be aware of reported activities that you haven't seen or heard.

Pattern "C" appears to be a combined division and regimental artillery group without any forward movement of assets. As such, it presents an unclear picture. It may mean that the Threat commander is keeping his artillery "silent" in preparation for a major bombardment; it may mean that he is providing little support in your sector and allocating his artillery assets elsewhere; or it could mean that bn/bde/division collection assets need to be "tweeked" to obtain more information about the Threat artillery disposition. In the absence of other indicators, this is a situation to be mindful of, but not overly concerned with.



FRAME 40


SITUATION CONTINUED: THE FOLLOWING REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN THE TOC OVER THE PAST HALF HOUR.

- "Heavy artillery concentrations are being fired vicinity Hill 1561."
- "122mm artillery fire received vicinity RUB RIDGE."
- "They're laying down a smoke screen between KOPI KARIM and Hill 1683. I can't see what's happening on the trigh east of there."
- "Dust clouds are continuing behind HIT RIDGE".
- "Two tanks and two BMPs are moving between Hill 1683 and HIT RIDGE."


FRAME 41

QUESTION: GIVEN THESE LATEST REPORTS, WHICH OF THE THREAT MANEUVER PATTERNS ILLUSTRATED BELOW MIGHT YOU ANTICIPATE DEVELOPING OVER THE NEXT TWO HOURS?


ANSWER: \_\_\_\_



A



B



C

FRAME 42

Most Correct Answer Is:

"A"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The correct answer is "A". The reported Threat activity provides clear evidence that the Threat commander is interested in your southern sector. He has seemingly moved units to the south. He has probed your positions in that area. He has probably cleared a path through the minefields you laid along TRIGH EIFFEL, and he has fired some artillery preparations in the southern sector. If you accept these activities as indicative of his intentions, then you might well expect that his next move may well be (1) a limited attack in the northern sector to hold your units in place in the north; (2) a frontal attack from between Hill 1683 and Hit Ridge into your positions vicinity of Hill 1607 to fix your units in that position; (3) an enveloping attack sweeping from the southern horn of Hit Ridge into your positions vicinity of Hill 1561 and driving east around Hill 1561 to cut off any avenue of escape from positions on Hills 1607 and 1561. This approach to the battle is consistent with his doctrine. When backed by the reported indicators, the visualization of his battle plan presented in Pattern A seems to be supportable. An aggressive information collection plan can help to substantiate or deny this visualization of the battlefield during the next two hours. The answer you selected was \_\_\_\_\_. (logic associated with the selected answer appears here). If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the correct answer which is "A". The reported Threat activity provides clear evidence that the Threat commander is interested in your southern sector. He has seemingly moved units to the south. He has probed your positions in that area. He has probably cleared a path through the minefields you laid along TRIGH EIFFEL, and he has fired some artillery preparations in the southern sector. If you accept these activities as indicative of his intentions, then you might well expect that his next move may well be (1) a limited attack in the northern sector to hold your units in place in the north; (2) a frontal attack from between Hill 1683 and Hit Ridge into your positions vicinity of Hill 1607 to fix your units in that position; (3) an enveloping attack sweeping from the southern horn of Hit Ridge into your positions vicinity of Hill 1561 and driving east around Hill 1561 to cut off any avenue of escape from positions on Hills 1607 and 1561. This approach to the battle is consistent with his doctrine. When backed by the reported indicators, the visualization of his battle plan presented in Pattern A seems to be supportable. An aggressive information collection plan can help to substantiate or deny this visualization of the battlefield during the next two hours."]

## FRAME 43

### REVIEW:

It appears fairly apparent that the Threat commander is preparing to launch an attack on your position. The challenge to you is to figure out, "Where", "In What Form", "With What" and "When". The reported Threat activity provides clear evidence that the Threat commander is interested in your southern sector. He has seemingly moved units to the south. He has probed your positions in that area. He has probably cleared a path through the minefields you laid along TRIGH EIFFEL, and he has fired some artillery preparations in the southern sector.

If you accept these activities as indicative of his intentions, then you might well expect that his next move may well be that illustrated by Pattern A: (1) a limited attack in the northern sector to hold your units in place in the north; (2) a frontal attack from between Hill 1683 and Hit Ridge into your positions vicinity of Hill 1607 to fix your units in that position; (3) an enveloping attack sweeping from the southern horn of Hit Ridge into your positions vicinity of Hill 1561 and driving east around Hill 1561 to cut off any avenue of escape from positions on Hills 1607 and 1561. This approach to the battle is consistent with his doctrine. When backed by the reported indicators, the visualization of his battle plan presented in Pattern A seems to be supportable. An aggressive information collection plan can help to substantiate or deny this visualization of the battlefield during the next two hours.

Pattern "B", of course, could be his disposition for the attack. However, it does not support his doctrinal proclivity to avoid frontal assaults and to employ enveloping and flanking attacks. Additionally, the employment of a tank battalion in the MRR attack is not normal doctrine. He will use tanks as part of a combined force in the attack, but normally employs the tank heavy force as the follow on or exploitation force after the motorized rifle battalions have conducted the initial attack.

Pattern "C" could also be his attack disposition, but, again, neither the reported activities nor his doctrinal writings would indicate this pattern of attack. Normally, the Threat will not employ all forces on line, preferring to retain a follow-on force for exploitation after the initial attack. Additionally, the Threat commander will not normally attack into a position which he has not reconnoitered or developed in some way. In this instance, your positions in the vicinity of Hill 1607 have been virtually untested.

You may believe that none of the pattern illustrated accurately represents the Threat commander's intent. In that case, you have the obligation to develop your own pattern or "mental model" of the battlefield and to work out the logic to support it using Threat doctrine, U. S. doctrine, and lessons learned.

FRAME 44


SITUATION CONTINUED: THE FOLLOWING REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN THE TOC OVER THE PAST HOUR.

- "Five reconnaissance vehicles are moving around the northern and southern flanks of KOPI KARIM"
- "Receiving heavy artillery on RUB RIDGE. It includes heavy concentrations of rocket fire"
- "Smoke continues in the valley between KOPI KARIM and Hill 1683."
- "Helicopters sighted vicinity KOPI ALLEEN. They appear to be a mix of HIPs and HINDs."


FRAME 45

QUESTION: GIVEN THE MOST RECENT REPORTS, WHICH OF THE THREAT MANEUVER PATTERNS ILLUSTRATED BELOW MIGHT YOU ANTICIPATE DEVELOPING OVER THE NEXT 4 HOURS?


ANSWER: \_\_\_\_



A



B



C

FRAME 46

Most Correct Answer Is:

"C"

[Instructions for feedback: If the student selects a wrong answer, the following message appears. "The most correct answer is "C". If the majority of the Threat division forces are concentrated for an attack in your sector, it could well be reflected by this pattern. The division objectives will be considerably deeper than those of the MRR (as reflected by what was probably an airmobile insertion on KOPI ALLEEN). If you "read" this pattern early enough, hopefully the brigade commander will reinforce your position and launch spoiling attacks so that you can fight this battle to a winning conclusion. The answer you selected was \_\_\_\_\_. (logic associated with the selected answer appears here). If the student selects the correct answer, the following message appears. "You selected the most correct answer which is "C". If the majority of the Threat division forces are concentrated for an attack in your sector, it could well be reflected by this pattern. The division objectives will be considerably deeper than those of the MRR (as reflected by what was probably an airmobile insertion on KOPI ALLEEN). If you "read" this pattern early enough, hopefully the brigade commander will reinforce your position and launch spoiling attacks so that you can fight this battle to a winning conclusion."]

## FRAME 47

### REVIEW:

Reported presence of the Threat division reconnaissance battalion assets, use of the division rocket assets, and use of helicopter assets with possible airmobile troop insertions are indicators that the Threat division commander has selected the sector occupied by your battalion for the division main attack.

With the above information in mind, the forces portrayed in Pattern "A" do not adequately portray the forces likely to be in contact. Additionally, the Threat division commander will likely attempt a flanking or enveloping attack movement just as will his commanders at lower echelons with the difference being that the division intermediate and final objectives will be considerable deeper than the regimental or battalion objectives.

If you selected Pattern "B", you probably don't believe the indicators of a division commitment in your sector. You believe the indicators that you are still faced with "only" an attack by the MRR only. Good Luck!

Pattern "C" reflects that a majority of the division forces are concentrated for an attack in your sector. This is supported by the appearance of the reconnaissance battalion assets, use of the division rocket assets, and use of helicopter assets with possible airmobile troop insertions. The division objectives will be considerably deeper than those of the MRR (as reflected by what was probably an airmobile insertion on KOPI ALLEEN). If you "read" this pattern early enough, hopefully the brigade commander will reinforce your position and launch spoiling attacks so that you can fight this battle to a winning conclusion.

You may believe than none of the illustrated patterns portray a correct answer. The point is that you cannot ignore the reported indicators, and those must trigger a pattern of likely Threat behavior or activity in your mind. Using this "mental model", you can then check this against the thoughts of your staff, discuss its meaning, and wargame against the possibilities.